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 Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in the United 
Kingdom 
D Cabrelli*/A McAlpine** 
I. General Part – Overview of the corporate law framework 
1. Nature and distinction between various types of companies 
1 The Companies Acts (the applicable piece of legislation is the Companies Act 
2006 (‘the Act’ or ‘CA 2006’)) recognise the following forms of company: 
A. Private company limited by guarantee; 
B. Public company limited by guarantee; 
C. Private company limited by shares; 
D. Public company limited by shares; 
E. Private unlimited company; and 
F. Public unlimited company. 
2 UK Law also recognises the partnership, the Limited Partnership (regulated 
by the Limited Partnership Act 1907) and the Limited Liability Partnership 
(regulated by the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000). However, each of 
these aforementioned business vehicles are technically not ‘companies’ and as 
such, no more is said about them in this response to the questionnaire. UK law 
also recognises community interest companies, European Economic Interest-
ing Groupings and the European Company (Societas Europea), but nothing 
further is said about these corporate forms in this response on the basis that 
they are not business vehicles or that they are European in their nature, rather 
than UK-based. 
3 The Companies Acts prescribe a numerous clausus of companies. As such, it 
is not possible for legal persons to create any further companies by contract. 
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4 The Companies Acts also draw a distinction between private and public com-
panies. Apart from the principal point that only public companies may issue 
shares to the public,1 some of the further implications of this division are as 
follows: (1) additional regulatory rules apply to public companies, eg the pro-
visions of the UK Corporate Governance Code,2 the Financial Conduct Au-
thority’s Handbook3 and the Takeover Code4 tend to apply only to public 
companies, (2) only public companies whose shares are listed may be traded 
on the London Stock Exchange or AIM, (3) a public company must have a 
minimum allotted share capital of £ 50,000, one quarter of which must be ful-
ly paid up on issue, ie £ 12,500,5 and (4) the name of the public limited com-
pany (‘plc’) must end with the abbreviation ‘plc’, whereas the private compa-
ny’s name must end with the word ‘limited’ or the abbreviation ‘ltd’.6 How-
ever, it should be stressed that the content of the duties of directors does not 
vary depending on whether the director is a private company or plc. 
2. Legal personality and its consequences and the appointment, removal and 
accountability of the board  
5 Each of the companies prescribed by the Act are bodies corporate and possess 
separate legal personality from their members or directors: Salomon v Salo-
mon v Salomon & Co Ltd.7 
6 In the case of each of these forms of company, the law provides for the sepa-
ration of the property of the company from the property of each of the mem-
bers/shareholders or directors. As such, the company owns its assets, rather 
than its members. It has been held in court that the members do not have any 
rights as beneficiaries in the assets of the company in the sense of the compa-
ny owning the underlying assets but holding them in trust for the members.8 
7 Subject to certain carefully controlled and very limited exceptions, the general 
rule in UK law is that the shareholders of a plc or private limited company 
have limited liability for the debts of the company via-à-vis third parties: Sa-
 
1 CA 2006, sec 755. 
2 See <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx> (last visited 9 May 2017). At the time of writing, the 
Financial Reporting Council were about to embark on a review of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. 
3 See <http:A//www.fca.org.uk/handbook> (last visited 9 May 2017). 
4 See <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code> (last visited 9 May 2017)). 
5 CA 2006, secs 763 and 586. 
6 CA 2006, secs 58–60. 
7 [1897] Appeal Cases (AC) 22. 
8 See Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 and Short v Treasury 
Commissioners [1948] 1 King’s Bench (KB) 116, affirmed [1948] AC 534 House of 
Lords (HL). 
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lomon v Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.9 In the case of a plc by shares or a 
private limited company by shares, the liability of the shareholders for the 
debts of that company is limited to any value which remains unpaid on their 
shares. Meanwhile, in the case of the plc by guarantee, or a private company 
limited by guarantee, the liability of the members for the debts of the compa-
ny is not limited to the value of any shares in the company (since a company 
limited by guarantee will not usually have any shares) but to the value of the 
contribution which they have agreed to make towards the assets of the com-
pany on its winding up.10 The company and the members agree the extent of 
the guarantee in the memorandum of association of the company.11 
8 In the case of each of the companies listed at 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E and 1F, the 
corporate organs are (a) the shareholders in general meeting and (b) the board 
of directors. The board of directors is a unitary board, comprised of executive 
and independent non-executive directors. 
9 Regulations 17 of Schedule 1, and Regulation 20 of Schedule 3, to the Com-
panies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (‘the Model Articles’)12 provide 
that an individual may be appointed to the board of directors of a plc by 
shares or private limited company by shares in one of two ways, namely (1) 
by ordinary resolution of the shareholders, ie by a simple majority of the 
shareholders who vote on a show of hands or by poll,13 or (2) by co-option by 
the directors. Co-option involves a majority decision by the other directors on 
the board of directors to appoint an individual as a director. In practice, the 
appointment of directors by co-option is very common. 
10 The CA 2006 does not prescribe who the directors on the board should be. 
However, regulations 12 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3, to the 
Model Articles direct that an individual must be appointed to chair the meet-
ings of the board of directors of a plc by shares, private company limited by 
guarantee, or a private limited company by shares. The person appointed to 
that role is known as the ‘chairman’. Beyond the chairman, the CA 2006 and 
the Model Articles fail to provide for the roles of the other members of the 
board of directors. This can be contrasted with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, which recognises the roles of the chief executive, the senior independ-
ent director and a general division of responsibility between the executive and 
non-executive functions of the board of directors. 
 
9 [1897] AC 22. 
10 CA 2006, sec 3(3). 
11 In practice, it is common for the contribution to be limited to £ 5.  
12 See the model articles for private companies limited by shares and public companies in 
Schedules 1 and 3 to the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 
2008/3229)—see <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3229/contents/made>. 
13 CA 2006, sec 282(1). 
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11 There is no impediment to a legal person (ie not a natural person) being ap-
pointed as a member of a company. However, there are restrictions in place 
regarding the appointment of legal persons as directors of a company. At the 
time of writing, it is possible for a company to be appointed as a director of a 
private limited company, so long as at least one of the directors is a natural 
person.14 However, when secs 156A–156C of the CA 2006 come into force at 
some point in the future, it will no longer be valid for a company to act as a 
director, since all directors will have to be natural persons. 
12 The rules on the removal of directors from the board of directors are set out in 
the Act. Directors may be removed in terms of sec 168(1) of the CA 2006 by 
an ordinary resolution of the members of the company, ie by a simple majori-
ty of the shareholders who vote on a show of hands or by poll in general meet-
ing,15 The power of the members to remove a director arises, ‘notwithstanding 
anything in any agreement between [the company] and [the director]’. Fur-
thermore, there is no need for the members to satisfy any legally prescribed 
grounds or reasons for the removal of a director, ie in company law, a director 
may be removed for an arbitrary reason, no reason or a bad reason. A member 
proposing to remove a director must proceed by special notice procedure in 
terms of sec 312 of the CA 2006. The special notice procedure envisages the 
member providing notice to the company of an intention to remove a director 
at least 28 days before the general meeting at which the resolution is moved.16 
The company is then under an obligation to give notice to the members of any 
such ordinary resolution in the same manner and at the same time as it gives 
notice of the meeting.17 If it is impracticable for the company to give notice 
within the said 28-day timescale, the company must give its members notice 
at least 14 days before the meeting by advertisement in a newspaper having an 
appropriate circulation or in any other manner permitted by the company’s ar-
ticles of association.18 Moreover, when the company receives notice from a 
member intending to remove a director, the company must forthwith send a 
copy of that notice to the director concerned.19 At the meeting, the director 
has the right to protest his or her removal and has a right to be heard.20 If the 
director provides the company with representations in writing regarding his 
proposed removal, if time will allow, the company must send a copy of those 
representations to each of the members with the notice of the resolution given 
to the members of the company.21 
 
14 CA 2006, sec 155. 
15 CA 2006, sec 282(1). 
16 CA 2006, sec 312(1). 
17 CA 2006, sec 312(2). 
18 CA 2006, sec 312(3). 
19 CA 2006, sec 169(1). 
20 CA 2006, sec 169(2). 
21 CA 2006, sec 169(3). 
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13 Turning now to the relationship between the board of directors and the share-
holders in general meeting, regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and 
Schedule 3, to the Model Articles direct that the shareholders of a plc by 
shares, private company limited by guarantee, or a private limited company 
by shares, have the power to instruct the board of directors to take certain ac-
tion, or to refrain from taking certain action, by passing a special resolution in 
general meeting, ie by a 75% majority of the shareholders who vote on a show 
of hands or by poll.22 In such circumstances, the board of directors are legally 
bound to follow the instructions of the shareholders. This is a default rule set 
out in the Model Articles, but is adopted by the vast majority of plcs by shares 
and private limited companies by shares incorporated in the UK. It is an ex-
tremely important provision, because it establishes the constitutional balance 
of power between the shareholders in general meeting and the board of direc-
tors that is set by UK Company law. In essence, it demonstrates that UK com-
pany law is a shareholder-centric jurisdiction, since the originating power for 
the direction of the company rests with the shareholders, notwithstanding that 
the board has the day-to-day power and decision-making authority devolved 
to it in terms of regulations 3 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3, to 
the Model Articles. Whilst shareholders retain such valuable initiation and in-
struction rights under regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 
3, to the Model Articles, it should be recalled that the largest plcs by shares in 
the UK whose shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange have widely 
dispersed shareholders, which makes it difficult for their shareholders to be 
active or coalesce and co-ordinate their efforts to employ these rights to moni-
tor or control management. There is no supervisory or controlling board in 
the case of each of the forms of company recognised by UK law, since the 
UK operates a unitary, rather than two-tier, board structure. The UK Cor-
porate Governance Code envisages that non-executive directors appointed 
to the board of directors will perform a monitoring role. 
3. The qualifications of board members 
14 There is no vetting process prescribed by law as to who can qualify as a direc-
tor. As such, there are no basic education or professional criteria for entry to 
the office of director. However, directors must be over the age of 16.23 More-
over, there are provisions for the automatic termination of a director’s ap-
pointment and also for his/her disqualification by order of the court. For ex-
ample, an individual will cease to be a director with immediate effect where 
(i) he/she is made subject to a bankruptcy order, (ii) he/she makes a composi-
tion with his/her creditors generally in satisfaction of his/her debts, (iii) a reg-
istered medical practitioner gives a written opinion to the company that he/she 
 
22 CA 2006, sec 283(1). 
23 CA 2006, sec 157 
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has become physically or mentally incapable of acting as a director and may 
remain so for more than three months.24  
4. Investigations into directors’ misconduct 
15 UK company law does not lay down any mandatory provision for an internal 
or external audit in the event of any alleged board misconduct. Instead, any 
investigation would be conducted internally in accordance with the compa-
ny’s standard disciplinary and grievance procedures which apply to all of its 
employees. These provisions are likely to be largely based on the Code of 
Practice 1 on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures of the Advisory, Concil-
iation and Arbitration Service (‘the ACAS Code’).25 Section C.3 of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code does instruct boards of directors to create audit 
committees, whose function it is to monitor the risk management function and 
internal financial controls of the company, but is not designed to audit direc-
tors in the case of misconduct. Where there is managerial misconduct, it is left 
to the company itself to seek legal recourse. The main avenue for legal redress 
would be via a breach of the law of directors’ duties, but such a route would 
be blocked off if the director can convince a simple majority of the members 
of the company to pass an ordinary resolution ratifying or authorising such a 
breach, in which case, a disgruntled minority shareholder would have to at-
tempt to raise a statutory derivative action against the director in court under 
secs 260 to 269 of the CA 2006, or present an unfair prejudice petition in 
court in terms of sec 994 of the CA 2006. 
II. Liability for Damage Caused to the Company and to the Shareholders 
A. General requirements – scope of duties and violation of duty of care of 
directors 
5. Liability of the board and its members 
16 Upon their appointment, directors are obliged to discharge a number of ‘gen-
eral duties’ which are imposed on them by the CA 2006. The general duties 
are owed by the director to the company26 and the liability of directors under 
such general duties does not arise in the law of contract or tort, but by virtue 
of company law in the guise of the CA 2006. For that reason, the remedies 
 
24 See Regulation 18 of Schedule 1, Regulation 18 of Schedule 2, and Regulation 22 of 
Schedule 3, to the Model Articles. 
25 See <http://www.acas.org.uk/?articleid=2174>. 
26 CA 2006, sec 170(1). Directors do not generally owe their duties to the shareholders of 
the company: Percival v Wright [1902] Law Reports, Chancery Division (3rd Series) 
(Ch) 421; Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co Ltd v Multinational Gas and Petro-
chemical Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258. The directors’ duties will be owed to shareholders 
only where a direct fiduciary relationship exists between director and shareholder: 
Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 Butterworths Company Law Cases (BCLC) 372.  
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which may be granted where a director has breached one of the general duties 
which is fiduciary in character – on which subject, see below – are much 
broader than would be the case if the liability arose in contract or tort. For ex-
ample, along with the general remedies of damages or a declaratory order of 
the court, it is possible for a successful claimant to obtain an order for specific 
performance, injunctive relief and restitutionary remedies in equity, such as an 
account of profits, constructive trust and remedies against third parties who 
have dishonestly assisted the director in breach of fiduciary duty, or are in 
knowing receipt of funds. For further details, see below. 
17 The general duties are set out in secs 171–177 CA 2006 and are a codification 
of the duties owed by a director at common law:  
- The duty to act within powers and to obey the constitution 
(sec 171) 
- The duty to promote the success of the company (sec 172) 
- The duty to exercise independent judgment (sec 173)  
- The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (sec 174) 
- The duty to avoid conflicts of interest (sec 175) 
- The duty not to accept benefits from third parties (sec 176); and 
- The duty to declare an interest in a proposed transaction or ar-
rangement (sec 177) 
18 A distinction has traditionally been drawn between fiduciary duties and other 
duties of a director.27 A director’s duties, with the exception of the duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (sec 174), are fiduciary in nature. 
The distinction between fiduciary duties and other duties is perpetuated in CA 
2006 by virtue of sec 178. This provision states that the director’s duties con-
tained in secs 171–177 CA 2006 are, ‘with the exception of sec 174 (duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence) enforceable in the same way as 
the fiduciary duties owed by a director at common law.’ 28 The rationale for a 
director’s sec 174 duty not being viewed as fiduciary in nature is discussed 
below.29 
19 As the director occupies a fiduciary position in relation to the company, he is 
required to subordinate his own interests in favour of the company’s interests. 
 
27 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1. 
28 CA 2006, sec 178(2). 
29 Reference to Q13 answer.  
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Some of consequences of this are that the director must: act bona fide in a 
way he/she considers would promote the success of the company, not allow 
his own interests to conflict with those of the company and not make a secret 
profit which would affect the company’s interests.30 The fiduciary duties of a 
director are concerned with the director’s loyalty to the company.31 This is re-
flected in Millett LJs judgment in Bristol and West Building Society v Moth-
ew,32 a leading authority on fiduciary relationships:  
20 ‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core li-
ability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not 
make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where 
his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or 
the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the 
nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fi-
duciary.’33 
21 If a director breaches one or more of these duties,34 then the director will be 
liable to the company. Reference must, however, be made back to the com-
mon law when assessing the remedies available to the company against the di-
rector who breaches on or more of his duties. This is because, whilst the du-
ties of directors are codified, the remedies for breach of them are not.35 The 
common law remedies for breach of a director’s duties remain applicable. The 
remedy the company has against the director depends on the nature of the du-
ty breached. If the duty breached is not fiduciary – ie the director has breached 
his duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence which is embodied in 
sec 174 of the CA 2006 – then the remedies are in accordance with the com-
mon law principles applicable to negligence claims.36 The director will be lia-
ble to pay damages for the breach, and the award of damages in these circum-
 
30 CA 2006, secs 172 and 175–177. 
31 Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598. 
32 [1998] Ch 1. 
33 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per Millett LJ. 
34 CA 2006, sec 179 states ‘except as otherwise provided, more than one of the general du-
ties may apply in any given case.’ It is envisaged that two or more duties may apply to a 
specific situation and be breached by a director at the same time. The exceptions to this 
are secs 175 and 177. It is expressly provided in sec 175(3) that this provision does not 
apply where sec 177 is applicable. 
35 CA 2006, sec 178(1)-(2). 
36 Simon Mortimore et al (eds), Company Directors: Duties, Liabilities and Remedies (2nd 
edn 2013) at para 19.80. 
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stances is regulated by the rules relating to causation, foreseeability and quan-
tification of damages.37  
22 If the duty breached is fiduciary in nature, a range of remedies are available. It 
would be incorrect, however, to view payment by a director in breach of his 
fiduciary duties as purely compensatory of the company’s losses. The fiduci-
ary remedies available to the company do not generally depend on the loss to 
the company, but are concerned with the disgorgement of the director’s 
wrongly obtained gain.38 This may be contrasted with a claim for breach of a 
director’s duty to exercise reasonable care, where emphasis is on compensat-
ing the company for the loss they suffered as a result of the director’s negli-
gence.39 The remedies available to the company against a director in breach of 
his fiduciary duties are: 
• Constructive trust – this arises where a director misapplies com-
pany property and the property can be returned, in specie, by the 
director to the company. The property which is misappropriated 
by the director is treated as if it is owned by the director but for 
the benefit of the company. 
• Account of profits – any profit or gain enjoyed by the director 
can be disgorged 
• Equitable compensation/damages 
• Rescission – any contract to which the director committed the 
company may be rescinded. 
6. General statutory and non-statutory duties of the board and its members 
23 The ‘general duties’ of a director are contained in secs 171–177 CA 2006.40 
The provisions represent a codification of the common law duties of a direc-
tor. The common law authorities on director’s duties will, therefore, remain 
relevant in order to gain a proper understanding of the statutory form that di-
rector’s duties now take in secs 171–177 CA 2006. Section 170 of the CA 
2006 stipulates that: (1) secs 171–177 are to be interpreted and applied in the 
same way as the common law rules that the provisions replace; and (2) regard 
shall be had to the equivalent common law directors’ duties when interpreting 
and applying the general duties contained in statute.41 This has been reflected 
 
37 South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191; 
Dorchester Finance v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498.  
38 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All England Law Reports (All ER) 378.  
39 P Hood, What is so special about being a fiduciary? (2000) 4 Edinburgh Law Review 
(ELR) 308. 
40 CA 2006, sec 170(1). 
41 CA 2006, sec 170(3)-(4).  
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in case law post-dating the 2006 Act, with courts commenting that secs 171–
177 ‘appear[s] to do little more than set out the pre-existing law on the sub-
ject’42 and that they are intended to ‘extract and express the essence of the 
rules and principles which they have replaced.’43 
24 The general duties described in sec 170 CA 2006 are identified as: 
• The duty to act within powers (sec 171) – this duty requires a di-
rector to (a) act in accordance with the company’s constitution;44 
and (b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are 
conferred.45  
• The duty to promote the success of the company (sec 172) – this 
duty requires a director to act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the compa-
ny for the benefit of the members as a whole.46 In deciding what 
will promote the success of the company, the director must have 
regard to the factors listed in s172(1) and discussed in detail be-
low.  
• The duty to exercise independent judgment (sec 173) – this codi-
fies the common law duty on directors not to fetter their discre-
tion.47 The duty is not breached if the director: (1) merely takes 
advice;48 (2) acts in accordance with an agreement entered into 
by the company which limits the director’s exercise of discretion 
in the future;49 (3) acts in a way permitted by the company’s 
constitution;50 or (4) delegates his functions to an employee 
whom he can reasonably place reliance on.51  
• The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
(sec 174) – this duty requires the director to exercise the care, 
 
42 West Coast Capital (Lios) Ltd v DGC plc [2008] Scotland Court of Session, Outer 
House (CSOH) 72 at [21] per Lord Glennie. 
43 Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd [2011] Court of Appeal, Civil Division (EW-
CA Civ) 923 at [3] per Mummery LJ.  
44 CA 2006, sec 171(a). 
45 CA 2006, sec 171(b). 
46 CA 2006, sec 172(1). 
47 Re Englefield Colliery Co (1878) 8 Law Reports, Chancery Division (2nd Series) (Ch D) 
388; Re London and South-Western Canal Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 346.  
48 Green v Walkling [2008] BCLC 332; Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205.  
49 CA 2006, sec 173(2)(a). See also Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc [1994] 
1 BCLC 363 at 392 per Neill LJ.  
50 CA 2006, sec 173(2)(b).  
51 Dovey v Corey [1901] AC 477; Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407; 
Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028.  
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skill and diligence expected from: (a) a person carrying out the 
same functions as the director in question; and (b) a person with 
the knowledge and expertise the director actually has.52 The na-
ture, scope and operation of this duty is discussed in detail be-
low.  
• The duty to avoid conflicts of interest (sec 175) – sec 175 sets out 
a general duty to avoid conflicts of interests. This section deals 
with the situation where the director acts in a way which direct-
ly/indirectly conflicts, or may conflict, with the company’s inter-
ests. Examples of this include the director competing with the 
company through a personal business or utilizing company prop-
erty for personal benefit.53 
• The duty not to accept benefits from third parties (sec 176) – this 
provision deals with the situation where a third party gives a 
benefit to a director because he is a director or to influence his 
conduct as a director. Section 176 reformulates the common law 
duty on directors not to accept bribes or secret commissions.54  
• The duty to declare an interest in a proposed transaction or ar-
rangement (sec 177) – in contrast with the general duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest embodied in sec 175, sec 177 deals with con-
flicts where the director is dealing with the company. Section 177 
is also envisaged as dealing with a specific form of conflict, 
namely where the director has a direct/indirect interest in a ‘pro-
posed transaction or arrangement with the company.’55  
7. Nature and scope of the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
25 At common law, directors had a duty to act bona fide in the best interests of 
the company as a whole.56 Section 172 CA 2006 codifies this duty, stipulating 
that directors must act in the way they consider, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as 
a whole. In deciding what course of action is most likely to promote the suc-
cess of the company, sec 172(1) lays down a list of factors which the director 
must have regard to: 
 
52 CA 2006, sec 174(2)(a)-(b).  
53 Eg, see, IDC v Cooley [1972] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 443; CMS Dolphin Ltd v 
Simonet [2001] 2 BCLC 704; Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 434. 
54 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324. 
55 CA 2006, sec 177(1). 
56 Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 923; Howard Smith Ltd v 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821.  
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a) The likely consequences of any decision in the long term;57 
b) The interests of the company’s employees;58 
c) The need to foster the company’s business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others;59 
d) The impact of the company’s operations on the community and 
the environment;60 
e) The desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct;61 and 
f) The need to act fairly as between members of the company.62  
26 The list of factors contained in sec 172(1)(a)-(f) embody the so-called ‘en-
lightened shareholder-value approach.’63 This approach recognises that direc-
tors must act in the best interests of shareholders, but enables directors to fo-
cus on a wider range of factors which will maximise shareholder value in the 
long term.64 The theory is that the objective of the company will be achieved 
by the board of directors successfully managing the relationships and re-
sources which comprise the company’s business.65 It is thought that by having 
regard to the factors listed above, the proper course of action for the director 
looking to promote the success of the company will be illuminated.  
27 Both at common law and in sec 172, the duty requires a subjective analysis of 
what the director thinks, in good faith, is in the best interests of the company: 
‘The [director] must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider 
– not what a court may consider – is in the best interests of the company.’66 In 
practice, however, where an act or omission by a director results in serious 
 
57 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(a). 
58 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(b). 
59 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(c). 
60 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(d). 
61 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(e). 
62 CA 2006, sec 172(1)(f). 
63 Company Law Reform Bill White Paper (Cm 6456, 2005) para 3.3; Company Law Re-
view Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework URN 99/654 (DTI, 1999) at para 5.1.1 ff.  
64 On enlightened shareholder value see: AR Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Principle and Corporate Governance (2013); A Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate 
Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Ap-
proach’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577. 
65 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Econ-
omy: Developing the Framework (2000, URN 00/656) at para 3.51.  
66 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306 per Lord Greene MR.  
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detriment to the interests of the company, the director will have a more diffi-
cult task persuading the court that he genuinely believed his actions were 
promoting the success of the company.67 There is some authority which sug-
gests that even where the director acts in a way which he believes bona fide 
promotes the success of the company, he may still breach his sec 172 if he is 
deemed to have acted irrationally or perversely: ‘Bona fides cannot be the sole 
test, otherwise you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the compa-
ny, and paying away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bona 
fide yet perfectly irrational.’68  
28 The duty embodied in sec 172 is not framed as a duty of care. The duty to 
promote the success of the company flows from the director’s fiduciary rela-
tionship with the company.69 The fiduciary (director) must act in the best in-
terests of his principal (the company). There may be occasions when the di-
rector has to subordinate his interests to the interests of the company in order 
to discharge this duty. This is illustrated by the case of Re W & M Roith Ltd.70 
Here, Mr Roith had been a director of a company for 30 years, during which 
time he never had a written contract of employment with the company. When 
he became ill, he decided to put in place a service contract with the company. 
This service contract provided that if he died whilst in service, the company 
would pay a pension to Mr Roith’s wife for the rest of her life. When Mr 
Roith died and his executors sought to obtain payment of the pension, the liq-
uidator refused on the basis that the service agreement (and thus the pension) 
was not entered into for the benefit of the company or to promote its prosperi-
ty. The court agreed with the liquidator. The interests of the company were 
subordinated by the transaction to Mr Roith’s personal interest in providing 
for his wife. He was found to have breached the common law equivalent of 
the statutory duty to promote the success of the company and the court held 
that the transaction was not binding on the company. 
29 Finally, it should be stressed that there is nothing to suggest that the duty to 
promote the success of the company is limited to performance of work-related 
tasks for the company. 
7.1. CASE STUDY (safeguarding of interests) 
30 The happening of (a), (b) and (c) would likely constitute a breach of secs 171, 
172 and 174 of the CA 2006. It is very unlikely that D would be entitled to de-
 
67 Re Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80; Re Onslow Ditchling Ltd, Roberts v 
Frohlich [2011] 2 BCLC 625. 
68 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654 at 671 per Bowen LJ; Charter-
bridge Corp Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62; Re a Company, ex parte Glossop 
[1988] BCLC 570.  
69 Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 923 at [1] per Mummery 
LJ. 
70 [1967] 1WLR 432.  
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fend his/her conduct on the basis that it was a matter of his/her personal or 
private life, since the behaviour described in this scenario will reflect very 
poorly on C-Corporation. In such a case, C-Corporation would be entitled to 
damages in order to recover any loss suffered as a result of the breach of duty. 
However, C-Corporation would have to establish a clear causal link between 
its pecuniary losses and D’s breach of duty. Furthermore, D’s pecuniary loss-
es must not be too remote from the breach. If C-Corporation decides not to 
take legal proceedings against D, or the shareholders of C-Corporation pass an 
ordinary resolution under sec 239 of the CA 2006 ratifying the breach of duty 
committed by D in doing (a), (b) and (c), then a shareholder could seek to re-
cover C-Corporation’s pecuniary loss by raising a statutory derivative claim 
under secs 260–269 of the CA 2006, If the shareholder’s statutory derivative 
claim was successful, then C-Corporation would be entitled to a damages 
remedy in respect of the losses it suffered: as such, the shareholder who raised 
the successful derivative claim would not be entitled to the damages remedy. 
7.2. CASE STUDY (fiduciary duty and conflict of duties) 
31 In this case, D would be referred to as a ‘nominee’ director in UK company 
law, when he is acting in the capacity of director of A-Corporation for C-
Corporation, ie he is a nominee director appointed by C-Corporation to the 
board of A-Corporation. The first point to make is that there is nothing in UK 
company law which prohibits directors from holding multiple directorships or 
even from directly or indirectly (eg through another company) engaging in 
business that competes with the company71 of which they are a director, pro-
vided that the requisite approvals under the CA 2006 are secured beforehand 
from the board of directors or shareholders. Secondly, it is generally recog-
nised that when D is acting as a director of A-Corporation, he will owe the 
general duties embodied in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 to A-Corporation. 
As such, although nominated onto the board of A-Corporation by C-
Corporation, the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hawkes v 
Cuddy,72 demonstrates that the fact that D has been nominated to that office 
by C-Corporation does not, of itself, impose any duty on D to C-
Corporation.73 Thus, on the facts of the hypothetical case, the law would not 
 
71 However, in Scots law, there would appear to a general duty which prohibits a director 
from competing with the company, see the obiter statement of Lord President Hamilton 
in Commonwealth Oil & Gas Company Ltd. v Baxter [2009] Scotland Court of Session, 
Inner House (CSIH) 75 at para [5]. 
72 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291. See also Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp 
SA [2015] United Kingdom Privy Council (UKPC) 11; [2016] 1 BCLC 26. 
73 The director may owe duties to his nominator if he is an employee or officer of the nom-
inator, or by reason of a formal or informal agreement with his nominator, but such du-
ties do not arise out of his nomination, but out of a separate agreement or office. Such 
duties cannot, however, detract from his duty to the company of which he is a director 
when he is acting as such, on which, see Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291, at pa-
ra 32, per Stanley Burnton LJ. 
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treat D as having infringed his duty to avoid a conflict of interest in terms of 
sec 175(1) of the CA 2006. 
8. The extent of the board’s control and oversight 
32 A director is entitled to delegate his functions to employees and others (eg 
other directors) within the company: see Regulations 5 of Schedules 1, 2 and 
3 to the Model Articles. The courts recognise that in many companies, the 
board cannot manage the company’s business exclusively and extensive dele-
gation to other directors, senior managers and employees is inevitable. A di-
rector must exercise reasonable care and skill in making his decision to whom 
to delegate his functions. The person to whom the function has been delegated 
must appear trustworthy and capable of discharging it. An authoritative state-
ment on directors’ power of delegation is given by the Court of Appeal in Re 
Barings plc (No 5), approving the following extract from Parker J’s judgment 
in the same case: 
‘Whilst directors are entitled (subjects to the articles of association of the 
company) to delegate particular functions to those below them in the manage-
ment chain, and to trust their competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, 
the exercise of the power of delegation does not absolve a director from the 
duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions.’74 
33 Where the director delegates his functions to an employee within the compa-
ny, he retains a residual duty to supervise the employee he has instructed to 
perform the delegated task.75 This duty to supervise is a continuing duty 
which cannot be avoided. The directors will be responsible for ensuring there 
are adequate control systems in place which flag up misdemeanours in dele-
gated areas. The director will also need to ensure that they have sufficient 
knowledge of the company’s business to understand the warning signals 
which the control systems they have in place flag up.76 Individual directors 
will also have to exercise reasonable care in supervising other members of the 
board.77 If a director allows himself to be dominated, manipulated or bamboo-
zled by another director, then he will have breached his duty to exercise rea-
sonable care and skill.78  
 
74 Re Barings plc (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523 at [36].  
75 Brumder v Motornet Service and Repairs Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 2783; Equitable Life As-
surance Society v Bowley [2004] 1 BCLC 180; Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 
433 at 486–489.  
76 Re Westmid Packaging Services Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 646. 
77 Lexi Holdings (In Administation) v Luqman [2009] 2 BCLC 1; Weavering Capital (UK) 
Ltd (In Liquidation) v Dabhia [2013] EWCA Civ 71. 
78 Re Westmid Packaging Services Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 646.  
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9. Responsibility for compliance monitoring 
34 Compliance with such duties is imposed on directors in an individual capaci-
ty. As such, there is no collective responsibility for decision-making and all 
directors who commit a company pursuant to a course of action through their 
decision-making are potentially personally liable for that decision. Liability 
does not attach to the board of directors as a collective body. 
CASE STUDY (liability of individual board members for disadvantageous 
transactions authorised by the majority in a board meeting) 
35 In such a case, although the legal position is by no means clear-cut, D3 would 
likely be held to be in breach of sec 174 of the CA 2006, since he would be 
implicated in the corporate decision, having noted no form of protest or dis-
sent. However, if D3 notes his protest and has this minuted, then it would be 
unlikely that he would be treated as liable. 
10. Variation in duties and the standard of care expected of the board and its 
members under corporate, tort and contract law 
36 Unlike the rest of the duties imposed on directors under the CA 2006, the 
director’s duty to exercise reasonable care in terms of sec 174 is not catego-
rised as ‘fiduciary’ in nature.79 The rationale for not treating the director’s du-
ty of reasonable care as fiduciary in nature is that a director who falls below 
the standard of care expected of him, whilst negligent, is not necessarily dis-
loyal to the company he is a director of.80 Fiduciary duties are concerned with 
the director’s honesty and loyalty to the company and are based on principles 
of equity. The director’s duty to exercise reasonable care, on the other hand, 
focuses on the director’s competence and is derived from the law of negli-
gence in tort.81  
37 The standard of care which must be observed by individual directors when 
performing their duties finds its expression in sec 174 CA 2006. This provi-
sion replaces the common law duty to exercise reasonable care, but the statu-
tory form of the duty is intended to be interpreted and applied in the same way 
 
79 This is expressly recognised by Companies Act 2006. Sec 178(2) identifies the duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence as an exception to the rule that the duties 
codified in secs 171–177 are enforceable in the same way as fiduciary duties owed to a 
company by its directors.  
80 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per Millett LJ: ‘A servant 
who loyally does his incompetent best for his master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of 
a breach of fiduciary duty.’ 
81 Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598; Re City Equitable 
Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407; PL Davies/S Worthington (eds), Gower and Da-
vies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn 2012) at paras 16–24. 
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as the corresponding common law rule which it replaces.82 Section 174 CA 
2006 sets out that ‘a director of a company must exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence.’83 The standard of care, skill and diligence applicable to a 
director is measured in accordance with a two part test:84 
a) the knowledge skill and experience reasonably expected from a 
person carrying out the functions carried out by a director in rela-
tion to the company;85 and 
b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director 
has.86  
38 Part (a) evaluates the director’s conduct against a ‘general’ standard of care 
that is expected from all directors. This is an objective test. If the director’s 
conduct falls short of the general standard expected from all directors under 
sec 174(2)(a), then the sec 174 standard of care will have been breached. But 
even if the director is deemed to have met the general standard, he may still be 
in breach of his duty if he fails to meet the ‘specific’ standard of care expected 
from the director in question. In part (b) the director’s conduct is assessed 
against a standard of care which is based on the specific knowledge, skill and 
experience that the director actually possesses. This is a subjective test. If the 
director fails to meet the specific standard imposed on him - he will have 
breached his sec 174 duty, irrespective of the fact that he may have met the 
general standard expected of all directors described in part (a). As such, 
sec 174 adopts what may be described as an ‘objective plus’ standard. It im-
poses a minimum standard of care based on an objective analysis of what is 
expected from all company directors generally; but which can be raised by the 
subjective element of the test for directors who have special knowledge and 
experience: 
39 Section 174 is in two parts. The first part, in sec 174(2)(a), is that a director 
must exercise the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a rea-
sonably diligent person with “the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out 
by the director in relation to the company”. This objective test sets the floor. 
The second part of the definition, in sec 174(2)(b), will displace it where the 
 
82 CA 2006, sec 170(4). Authorities pre-dating CA 2006 will, therefore, remain relevant in 
the interpretation of sec 174.  
83 CA 2006, sec 174(1). 
84 The two part test contained in sec 174 reflects the test laid down in the context of wrong-
ful trading, as set out in sec 214 Insolvency Act 1986. The wording of sec 174 is sub-
stantially the same as that of the wording in sec 214(4) Insolvency Act 1986. 
85 CA 2006, sec 174(2)(a). 
86 CA 2006, sec 174(2)(b). 
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particular director under consideration has greater knowledge, skill and expe-
rience than may reasonably be expected.’87 
40 It has long been recognised that errors in judgment do not automatically mean 
that the director has breached his duty to exercise care, skill and diligence.88 
Courts are generally reluctant to interfere with and impose liability on direc-
tors who have made commercial decisions that they believed in good faith 
were in the best interests of the company.89 The option of including an 
equivalent to the ‘business judgment rule’ – as enacted in the USA and Aus-
tralia – in sec 174 was rejected by the drafters of the CA 2006. Drafters feared 
that imposition of a standard of business judgment on directors would have a 
‘chilling effect’ on risk-taking by company directors and create a culture of 
excessive caution.90 The absence of an equivalent to the business judgment 
rule reflects the drafters’ intention to encourage directors to exercise their dis-
cretion and commercial judgment.91  
10.2. CASE STUDY (concretisation of the standard of duty; Business Judg-
ment Rule) 
41 As mentioned above, directors will not be liable for breaching their duty to 
exercise reasonable care for errors in business judgment. D is not required to 
be right about the expansion of C-Corporation, but is required to display rea-
sonable care in making the decision about which countries C-Corporation 
should expand into. Reasonable care in this context is likely to be achieved if 
D has made an informed decision about C-Corporation’s expansion. Such an 
approach to reasonable care is consistent with authority that indicates direc-
tors have a duty to actively acquire knowledge about, and keep themselves in-
formed on, the company’s business.92 The courts have taken a dim view of di-
rectors who have tried to plead ignorance as a defence to decisions of the 
 
87 Brumder v Motornet Service and Repairs Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 2783 at [46] per Beatson 
LJ.  
88 Roberts v Frohlich [2011] 2 BCLC 625; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
[1974] AC 821; Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407; Re Brazilian 
Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425 (Ch D); Lagunas Nitrate Company v 
Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392; Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb (1872) Law Reports 
(LR) 5 HL 480. 
89 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821; Mortimore (fn 36) at pa-
ra 14.33. 
90 Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulat-
ing a Statement of Duties (Report No 261, 1999) paras 5.28–5.29; Company Law Re-
view Steering Group Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing 
the Framework (2000, URN 00/656) paras 3.69–3.70. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Weavering Capital (UK) Ltd v Peterson [2012] EWHC 1480 (Ch); Re Barings plc 
(No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523 CA; Re Barings plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Indus-
try v Baker [1998] British Company Cases 583; Re Westmid Packaging Services Ltd (No 
2) [1998] 2 All ER 124. 
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board which have proven ill-advised.93 In Re Westmid Packaging Services 
Ltd, a director’s absence from board meetings was not a defence to negligence 
but itself constituted negligence.94  
42 The following measures may indicate that D has taken the steps necessary to 
make an informed decision about C’s expansion and thus discharge his duty to 
exercise reasonable care: 
43 Advice of experts – D may wish to seek the advice of experts (eg lawyers, 
accountants), especially from within the countries which C-Corporation may 
expand into. D will need to select the experts with appropriate care and ensure 
the expert’s views do not impinge upon D’s duty to exercise independent 
judgment when deciding which countries to expand C-Corporation into.95 In 
addition, D will only be able to rely on the expert’s advice if it is reasonable 
to do so.96 If these steps were taken but the expansion failed and as a result C-
Corporation suffered loss, it is likely that D would be able to escape liability 
for breach of his duty to exercise reasonable care. The taking of professional 
or expert advice is a factor which courts take into account as indicating the di-
rector has exercised reasonable care and skill when performing his duties.97 
44 Delegating functions to others within C-Corporation – It is likely that D will 
wish to delegate some of his functions in order to give himself a full picture of 
the countries C-Corporation will expand into. He may wish employees from 
within C-Corporation to prepare reports on the foreign countries for potential 
expansion. D is entitled to delegate particular functions to those below him in 
the management of C-Corporation and place reasonable trust in their integrity 
and competence.98 But delegation by D does not absolve him of his duty to 
supervise delegated functions.99 D will also be responsible for ensuring there 
are adequate control systems in place which flag up misdemeanours in dele-
gated areas.100 D’s duty to supervise is a continuing one. If D can demonstrate 
that he undertook sufficient supervision of the employees he delegated func-
tions to in relation to the expansion of C-Corporation, he will be protected 
 
93 See Re Westmid Packaging Services Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 124; Dorchester Finance Co 
Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498; 
94 [1998] 2 All ER 124. 
95 CA 2006, sec 173. 
96 Re Douglas Construction Services Ltd [1988] BCLC 397. 
97 Green v Walkling [2007] England & Wales High Court (EWHC) 3251 (Ch); FB Palm-
er/G Morse (eds), Palmer’s Company Law, vol 2 (2013) para 8.2813.  
98 Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407; Norman v Theodore Goddard 
[1991] BCLC 1027; Andrew Oliver & Son Ltd v Douglas 1981 SC 192 OH. 
99 See above and Re Barings plc (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 433 approved [2000] 1 BCLC 523 
CA; Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley [2004] 1 BCLC 180.  
100 PL Davies and S Worthington, Principles of Modern Company Law (2016, 10th ed) at 
paras 16–17. 
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from any argument that he breached his duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill.  
45 Regular board meetings – On receipt of the expert advice and reports on 
countries for potential expansion, D may wish to hold board meetings to dis-
cuss the expert’s views and content of the reports. Regular board meetings 
will show that D and other directors have exercised care and engaged in 
meaningful discussion about which countries are best for C-Corporation’s ex-
pansion.101 D is less likely to be liable for a breach of his duty to exercise rea-
sonable care if he has discussed the information and literature available to him 
about the countries C-Corporation can expand into with the rest of the board.  
46 As mentioned above, the courts are generally reluctant to engage in analysis 
of the merits of commercial decisions made by a board of directors in good 
faith. As Lord Wilberforce said in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd: 
47 ‘[Their Lordships] accept that it would be wrong for the court to substitute its 
opinion for that of the management, or indeed to question the correctness of 
the management's decision, on such a question, if bona fide arrived at. There 
is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will 
courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions 
within the powers of management honestly arrived at.’102  
48 If D makes the informed decision (using the measures discussed above) that 
the expansion of C-Corporation is too risky and decides not to proceed, it is 
unlikely that he will face liability for breach of his duty to exercise reasonable 
care. There is, however, some dicta indicating that the courts will impose lia-
bility on directors for breach of their duty to exercise reasonable care where 
the decision made was one which no reasonable director or one possessing the 
particular director’s expertise would have made.103 The fact that D’s decision 
in this instance is an omission, ie a decision not to do something (in this case, 
not expand the business of C-Corporation) does not absolve D from liability 
for breach of his duty to exercise reasonable care. A director who fails to act 
 
101 The frequency of board meetings is a factor the court has taken into account in the con-
text of wrongful trading cases where courts have to consider whether directors of com-
panies on the brink of insolvency have exercised reasonable care in their decision to con-
tinue trading: see Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc (in liq) [2007] BCLC 287 
at paras107–108, 283. 
102 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 at 832. 
103 Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb (1872) LR 5 HL 480 at 494 per Lord Hatherley LC: ‘cog-
nisant of the circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and so simple of 
appreciation, that no men with any ordinary degree of prudence, acting on their own be-
half, would have entered into such a transaction as they entered into.’ This dicta is be-
lieved to be equally applicable to omissions by directors, see: Mortimore (fn 36) at pa-
ra 14.34. 
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or avoids activities which are part of his role as a director can still be liable for 
breaching his duty to exercise reasonable care.104  
11. Factors influencing duties and the standard of care 
49 ‘Reasonable care, skill and diligence’ is an abstract concept which can be 
applied universally to a variety of different factual scenarios. It is for this rea-
son that the courts have been reluctant to lay down definitive principles as to 
what constitutes ‘reasonable care, skill and diligence.’105 The following are 
factors which may be taken into account by the court in determining the 
standard of care imposed on a director, but it should be noted that none of 
these factors are decisive: as such, there may be penumbral areas where the 
weight attached to each factor will reasonably differ: 
50 Business focus, size and purpose of company – The courts have reiterated on 
several occasions that the scope of a director’s duty to exercise reasonable 
care requires consideration of the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. The size of the company, the nature of its business, the regulatory re-
gime affecting the industry in which the company operates are all factors 
which will affect the scope of a director’s duty of care.106 The larger the or-
ganisation, the more a director may be entitled to delegate his functions 
amongst those below him in management of the company or rely on the ex-
pertise of particular departments within the company. But the extent of a di-
rector’s duty to exercise reasonable care will depend on ‘how the particular 
company’s business is organised and the part which the director could reason-
ably have been expected to play.’107 Directors are, however, responsible for 
ensuring that they understand the focus and nature of the business they are a 
director of. In Weavering Capital (UK) Ltd v Peterson,108 the director was 
found to have been negligent in approving the company’s swaps trading poli-
cy. It was held that if the director had acquired sufficient knowledge and un-
derstanding of the company’s business, she would have known that she could 
not, consistently with her duties as a director, have given such approval.  
51 Financial scope of given project – There is little authority on the effect a pro-
ject with large financial scope has on a director’s duty to exercise reasonable 
care. But if a financial project involves only a small portion of the company’s 
turnover, it is foreseeable that the director may be excused for giving that pro-
ject less attention. If a financial project embarked upon by a company is more 
 
104 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498. 
105 See Brumder v Motornet Service and Repairs Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 195 at [55] per 
Beatson LJ. 
106 Lexi Holdings plc (In Administration) v Luqman [2009] EWCA Civ 117; Mortimore 
(fn 36) at paras 14.08–14.09. 
107 Bishopgate Management Co Ltd v Maxwell (No 2) [1994] 1 All ER 261 at 264 CA per 
Hoffmann LJ; see also Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433 at 484 per Parker J. 
108 [2012] EWHC 1480 Ch. 
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significant, it is reasonable for the shareholders to expect the director to de-
vote more attention and effort to that project. With this in mind, it is likely 
that a director will be subject to a higher standard of care for financial projects 
which are larger in scope and which could have a profound impact on the 
company if successful (or unsuccessful). 
52 Financial situation of company – A director will be subject to a more onerous 
standard of care when the financial position of the company is more precari-
ous. Acts which a director may undertake in relation to a solvent company 
may not be appropriate in relation to a company which is insolvent or is on 
the verge of insolvency. The level of risk which a director may expose the 
company to whilst still discharging his duty to exercise reasonable care will 
necessarily drop as the solvency of the company becomes more doubtful. The 
duties of a director of a company on the verge of insolvency are discussed 
more fully below.  
53 Remuneration received by directors – There is authority which indicates that 
the level of reward a director is entitled to may be a relevant factor in estab-
lishing the scope of that director’s duty to exercise reasonable care. In Re Bar-
ings plc (No 5) Parker J acknowledged that ‘the higher the level of reward, the 
greater the responsibilities which may reasonably be expected (prima facie, at 
least) to go with it.’109 
54 Expertise and training of directors – In determining the scope of a director’s 
duty to exercise reasonable care, the knowledge and experience that a director 
possesses will be taken into account. Even if the director has not breached the 
objective standard of care expected of all directors contained in sec 174(2)(a) 
CA 2006, he can still be liable for breach of duty if he fails to meet the stand-
ard of care contained in sec 174(2)(b), which is based on the specialist 
knowledge and expertise of the particular director in question. If the director 
has greater knowledge and expertise than that ordinarily expected from a di-
rector of a company, a higher standard of care will be expected from him.110 
Here sec 174(2)(b) CA 2006 operates to raise the standard of care which must 
be met by a director who has specialist expertise or training.  
55 Executive and non-executive directors – Section 174 CA 2006 does not dis-
tinguish between executive and non-executive directors. There is nothing in 
CA 2006 to indicate that a non-executive director’s duty of care is any less 
onerous than that of an executive director. That being said, shareholder expec-
tations of non-executive directors differ. It is unreasonable to expect a non-
executive director to devote the same amount of attention to the company as 
 
109 Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, 488 at para B6; see also Re Barings plc, Sec-
retary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker [1998] British Company Cases 583 at 586 
per Sir Richard Scott VC. 
110 See discussion on CA 2006, sec 174(2)(b) above. 
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an executive director. Non-executive directors are less involved in the day-to-
day running of the company but perform a supervisory role – constructively 
challenging the executive directors and monitoring their performance.111 The 
courts recognise that whilst the non-executive’s duty of care is expressed in 
the same terms in sec 174 CA 2006, the duty will be applied differently in 
practice. Non-executive directors must exercise reasonable care in supervising 
the executive directors.112 They cannot place unquestioning reliance on the 
management of the company or be a mere ‘yes-man’ to the board.113 Conduct 
of this sort is likely to be a breach of a non-executive director’s duty to exer-
cise reasonable care.  
11.2. CASE STUDY (applicable standard of care) 
56 (a) For a person not involved in the banking industry, it would not have been 
apparent that the transaction was adverse. But as discussed above, a director is 
expected to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the company’s business to be able to properly discharge his duties. It will not, 
therefore be a defence that D could not have known the transaction was ad-
verse because banking was not an area of business he was familiar with. D 
will be expected to exercise the care, skill and diligence that ‘may reasonably 
be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director 
in relation to the company’ – taking into account D’s obligation to familiarise 
himself with the business of B-Bank. The baseline standard of reasonable 
care, skill and diligence imposed on D by the objective standard of care laid 
down in sec 174(2)(a) would dictate that he should recognise adverse transac-
tions apparent to an ordinary businessman familiar with the business of B-
Bank. Failure by D to recognise the transaction as adverse in these circum-
stances could constitute a breach of his duty to B-Bank to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence under sec 174 CA 2006. It is therefore possible that D 
will be liable in damages to B-Bank in respect of the loss occasioned by neg-
ligently entering an adverse transaction. 
57 (b) Here the transaction is not recognised as adverse by an ordinary business-
man familiar with the business of B-Bank, but a more experienced profession-
al bank manager. It is unlikely that the objective standard imposed on D by 
sec 174(2)(a) requires him to exhibit the care, skill and diligence of an experi-
enced professional bank manager. The ordinary director of a UK company 
cannot be expected to exercise the skill of an experienced professional bank 
manager. It is, therefore, unlikely in these circumstances that D will be liable 
in damages for the loss occasioned by his failure to recognise that the transac-
 
111 This is consistent with the guidance on the role of non-executive directors contained in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, A.4 Non-Executive Directors. 
112 Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley [2004] 1 BCLC 180 at [35]–[41]; Lexi Hold-
ings plc v Luqman [2009] 2 BCLC 1, CA.  
113 Ibid. 
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tion was adverse to B-Bank. If, however, D had specialist knowledge or ex-
pertise (eg had worked as an experienced professional bank manager), then 
the standard of care, skill and diligence imposed on D will be based on the 
specialist knowledge or expertise he possesses about transactions of this na-
ture. This is because sec 174 imposes on D a duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence based on ‘the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
the director has.’ In these circumstances, it is more likely that D will have 
breached his sec 174 duty and will be liable in damages.  
12. The board and its members' duties and liability in the vicinity of insolven-
cy 
58 When a company is in danger of entering insolvent liquidation, it is often said 
that the directors have a duty to ‘take into account the interests of creditors’. 
The rationale for this is to ensure that, when insolvency is imminent, the com-
pany’s property is not dissipated or exploited to the prejudice of the credi-
tors.114 Despite having a clear rationale, the legal source of the duty is rather 
opaque. 
59 The director’s duty to promote the success of the company (discussed above) 
is by virtue of sec 172(3) CA 2006 ‘subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests 
of the creditors of the company.’ The most obvious enactment which 
sec 172(3) alludes to is sec 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) – the 
provisions on wrongful trading sec 214(1) IA 1986 allows the liquidator of an 
insolvent company to apply to the court for a declaration that a director is lia-
ble to make a contribution to the insolvent company’s assets out of his per-
sonal estate because the director has engaged in wrongful trading. The wrong-
ful trading provision is essentially a functional equivalent of the legal duty to 
file for insolvency which exists in a number of other European jurisdictions. 
60 The director will be liable to make a contribution where he is deemed to have 
been responsible for the company trading ‘wrongfully’ – ie trading at a point 
in time when he ‘knew or ought reasonably to have concluded that there was 
no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation.’115 The knowledge a director possesses for the purposes of deter-
mining whether he knew that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding in-
solvency is set out in sec 214(4)(a)-(b). It is based on: 
a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably 
be expected of a person carrying out the same functions are car-
ried out by that director;  
 
114 Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512 at 1516 per Lord 
Templeman. 
115 IA 1986, sec 214(2)(b). 
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b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director 
has.116  
61 The test contained in sec 214(4) contains both an objective and a subjective 
element. Section 214(4)(a) sets an objective standard of knowledge which is 
imposed on all directors of UK companies. Section 214(4)(b) sets a subjective 
standard based on the expertise that a particular director possesses. Take the 
example of a company’s creative director and finance director. The two will 
have different subjective knowledge of the company’s solvency. It would be 
reasonable to expect the finance director to have a higher level of understand-
ing of the company’s solvency and sec 214(4)(b) will operate to set a standard 
which reflects the specialist knowledge that the finance director possesses. 
But the two directors are expected to have the same objective baseline stand-
ard of knowledge by virtue of sec 214(4)(a). The creative director will there-
fore be precluded from evading liability because he has minimal knowledge 
about the company’s solvency. It will be noted that this test operates similarly 
to the one applied when determining the scope of a director’s duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence in terms of sec 174 of the CA 2006 (dis-
cussed above).117 
62 If the court is satisfied that a director continued trading with knowledge that 
there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, the direc-
tor can still avoid liability for wrongful trading. Section 214 contains a de-
fence to wrongful trading, namely that the director took every step to mini-
mize potential losses to creditors of the company.118 If a director can establish 
this, he/she will not be liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets 
out of his/her personal estate.119 It is in this sense that directors are often said 
to have a duty to ‘minimize creditor’s losses’ or ‘take into account the inter-
ests of creditors’ when the company is on the brink of insolvency – because 
failure to do so will mean the sec 214(4) defence to wrongful trading is not 
available to them. Directors can discharge this duty (thus providing them-
selves with a defence to wrongful trading) by: 
 Obtaining professional advice from someone they can place reasonable re-
liance on – company auditor, independent accountant or, ideally, an insol-
vency practitioner.120 In Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc the 
 
116 IA 1986, sec 214(4)(a)–(b). 
117 Reference to Q10 and Q11 answers. In Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646, Hoff-
mann LJ’s formulation of the director’s duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and dili-
gence was modelled on IA 1986, sec 214(4)(a)–(b). The application of sec 214(4) to the 
duty to exercise reasonable care is now reflected in the similarly worded sec 174 CA 
2006.  
118 IA 1986, sec 214(3). 
119 Ibid. 
120 Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc (in liq) [2007] 2 BCLC 287; Re Douglas 
Construction Services Ltd [1988] BCLC 397 
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court looked favourably upon directors who repeatedly sought professional 
advice on whether the company should continue trading and reduced trading 
as the financial outlook became more bleak.121 
 Inform themselves of the company’s financial position. The clearer it be-
comes that creditor’s money is at risk from company dealings, the lower the 
risk to which the directors should expose the company financially and the 
more regularly the company’s financial position should be reviewed.122 Re-
ducing or ceasing trading is one potential ‘step’ which can be taken to min-
imise creditor’s losses.123  
13. Impact of selection criteria on duties and the standard of care 
63 There are no such restrictions imposed under the CA 2006 or the Model Arti-
cles. As such, there will be no effect on the standard or content of the statuto-
ry duty of care, skill and diligence in sec 174 of the CA 2006 or sec 214(4) IA 
1986. However, it would be possible for such restrictions to be imposed in the 
company’s articles of association. It is a moot point, and unresolved, whether 
such a provision in the articles would function to lower the standard of care. 
However, it is likely that such a provision would be taken into account by a 
court in establishing the content of the subjective element of the standard of 
care set out in sec 174(2)(b) CA 2006 and sec 214(4)(b) IA 1986, ie the gen-
eral knowledge, skill and experience that that director has. 
14. Compensation for damage to the corporation’s property or to sharehold-
ers’/partners’ property 
64 In such a case, yes, any losses suffered by the company as a result of the di-
rector’s misconduct could be recovered by the company. Where the miscon-
duct amounts to a breach of the director’s statutory duty of care, skill and dili-
gence in terms of sec 174(2) of the CA 2006 and the breach causes damage to 
the company’s property, the only remedies available to the company would be 
damages, and in certain exceptional situations, specific performance or injunc-
 
121 Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc (in liq) [2007] 2 BCLC 287. 
122 Re Bangla Television Ltd (in liq) [2010] BCC 143; Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd 
[2007] BCC 937. 
123 Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc (in liq) [2007] 2 BCLC 287 at [281] ‘[I]f 
the directors decide to close down immediately and cause the company to go into an ear-
ly liquidation, although they are not at risk of being sued for wrongful trading, they are 
at risk of being criticised on other grounds … Many creditors of the company from a 
time before the liquidation are likely to find that their debts do not get paid in full. They 
will complain bitterly that the directors shut down too soon; they will say that the direc-
tors ought to have had more courage and kept going. If they had done, so the complain-
ing creditors will say, the company probably would have survived and all of its debts 
would have been paid. Ceasing to trade and liquidating too soon can be stigmatised as 
the cowards’ way out.’ 
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tive relief. However, a greater range of remedies would be available to the 
company where the misconduct of the director constituted a breach of 
secs 171, 172, 173, 175, 176 or 177 of the CA 2006. In such a case, the com-
pany would be entitled to gain-based remedies such as an account of profits 
made by the director, as well as the right to rescission of any contracts con-
cluded by the company with third parties at the instance of the director as part 
of his breach of duty. In addition, equitable remedies such as specific perfor-
mance and injunctive relief would be available to the company. 
65 Where the director’s breach of duty causes damage to the property of the 
shareholders of the company or other third parties, it is not clear that the 
shareholders or such other third parties would be able to recover any losses 
which they sustained via the rules of company law, eg the statutory duties of 
directors in terms of secs 171–177 of the CA 2006: instead, it may be that 
they would have a claim in the law of contract, or more likely, in the law of 
tort/delict, eg the duty of care owed by the company and/or its directors in the 
law of negligence. The principal reason for this proposition is that the statuto-
ry duties in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 imposed on the directors are owed 
to the company, not to any shareholder or other third party. Even in circum-
stances where the shareholder raises a derivative claim under secs 260–269 of 
the CA 2006 and is successful in court, the shareholder would only be entitled 
to recover on behalf of the company in respect of the company’s losses only, 
ie the damage to the company’s property, rather than the damaged property of 
the shareholder him/her/itself.  
66 Where the property damage consists of a diminution in the value of a share-
holder’s shares in the company, the common law rule against ‘reflective loss’ 
would preclude that shareholder from recovering any loss sustained. This is 
based on the rationale that the shareholder’s loss in terms of the diminution in 
value of his shares in the company is merely reflective of the company’s loss. 
As explained by Lord Bingham of Cornhill: 
67 ‘Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, only the 
company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the suit of a share-
holder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a diminution in the 
value of the shareholder's shareholding where that merely reflects the loss suf-
fered by the company.’124 
14.1. CASE STUDY (compensation for damage to the corporation’s property 
or to shareholders’/partners’ property) 
68 Turning first to case 14.1, it would be likely that a court would conclude that 
D is in breach of his statutory duty of care, skill and diligence under sec 174 
of the CA 2006. He may also be in breach of his statutory duty to obey the 
 
124 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, 19. 
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terms of the company’s constitution in terms of sec 171 of the CA 2006 if the 
articles of association of the company impose limits on the extent to which D 
can commit C-Corporation to contracts with third parties. It is clear that only 
C-Corporation will be entitled to sue D for a breach of the secs 171 or 174 du-
ties in order to recover its loss. If either one of S1 or S2 voted against C-
Corporation raising a claim against D for breach of duty, then the other share-
holder (ie either S1 or S2) would have to raise a derivative claim under 
secs 260–269 of the CA 2006 in order to seek recovery of C-Corporation’s 
losses. However, the shareholder would have no right to raise a claim in a per-
sonal capacity to attempt to recover the company’s losses or his own personal 
losses, including losses in respect of any diminution in value of his shares. 
69 As regards the contract with X, apart from certain exceptional circumstances, 
C-Corporation would not be entitled to set aside the transaction, owing to the 
terms of secs 39 and 40 of the CA 2006. As such, X would be protected in 
terms of the transaction. 
70 As for the alternative scenario in Case 14.1, for the reasons given above, S1 or 
S2 would have no right to recover in respect of any reduction in value of their 
shares as a result of the common law principle against ‘reflective loss’. 
14.2. CASE STUDY (compensation for damage to the corporation’s property 
or to shareholders’/partners’ property due to delay in filing for insolvency) 
71 In such a case, C-Corporation would be entitled to recover any losses which it 
had sustained as a result of D’s recalcitrance in filing for the insolvency of C-
Corporation. The legal basis for this right of recovery would be sec 174 of the 
CA 2006, ie that D had breached his duty of care, skill and diligence, having 
fallen below the objective standard expected of a director in sec 174(2)(a) of 
the CA 2006, namely the ‘knowledge skill and experience reasonably ex-
pected from a person carrying out the functions carried out by a director in re-
lation to the company’. If C-Corporation decided not to take legal action 
against D on these grounds – eg because an ordinary resolution consisting of a 
simple majority vote of S1 and S2 was passed not to commit C-Corporation to 
such litigation – then S1 or S2 would have the capacity to seek recovery for 
C-Corporation under a statutory derivative claim in terms of secs 260–269 of 
the CA 2006. However, it is not clear from the facts of the Case Study 14.2 
that C-Corporation has in fact suffered any losses as a result of D’s breach of 
duty: the only losses referred to in the Case Study are the losses of the credi-
tors. 
15. Limitation periods 
72 The relevant statute is the Limitation Act 1980. Since any legal proceedings 
raised by the company for damages in respect of a director’s alleged breach of 
the general statutory duties prescribed in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 relate 
to the recovery of a sum under statute, the relevant time limit for such a claim 
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to be raised would be six years under sec 9 of the Limitation Act 1980. How-
ever, this time limit would not apply where the remedy sought was specific 
performance, injunctive relief or some other equitable remedy.125 The time pe-
riod of six years is identical to the time limit in respect of actions in contract 
or founded on tort, ie general civil liability.126 As such, there is no discrepan-
cy. 
15.1. CASE STUDY (suspension/interruption of the limitation period) 
73 Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 would apply to extend the period avail-
able to C-Corporation to raise an action seeking damages from D in respect of 
his alleged breach of statutory duty. However, C-Corporation would have to 
show that D ‘deliberately concealed’ a fact relevant to the alleged breach of 
statutory duty. The point in time at which the limitation period of six years 
will begin to run will be the date that the company discovers that such a fact 
has been concealed, or the date that it could have discovered such conceal-
ment with the application of reasonable diligence. 
74 In the case of the alternative scenario, D’s involvement may have postponed 
the coming to light of his misconduct. As such, sec 32 of the Limitation Act 
1980 will apply once again, so that the date from which the limitation period 
of six years begins to run will be pushed back to the date that C-Corporation 
actually became aware of D’s concealment or facts relating to that conceal-
ment. 
B. Modification of the general conditions for liability 
16. Adapting the scope and content of the board's and its members' duties 
75 Subject to certain limited exceptions, it is not legally possible for a company 
or its members to alter the scope and content of the duties laid down in 
secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 by virtue of any provision in a contract or the 
company’s articles of association. Section 232(1) provides that any provision 
that purports to exempt (to any extent, eg a full exclusion, or a restriction or 
limitation of liability) a director of a company from any liability that would 
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void. As such, a term of 
any contract or the company’s articles of association excluding or modifying 
liability for a breach of secs 171–177 would be of no legal effect: sec 232(3) 
of the CA 2006.  
76 Nor is it possible for a director to be protected by the company directly or 
indirectly providing that director with an indemnity in respect of any losses 
 
125 Limitation Act 1980, sec 36. 
126 Limitation Act 1980, secs 2 & 5. 
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sustained by the director in respect of any liability for breach of duty: 
sec 232(2) of the CA 2006.  
77 The recognised three exceptions are where the company supplies the director 
with (1) D&O insurance with an insurer duly furnishing the director with pro-
tection in respect of liability for breach of statutory duty, (2) a qualifying third 
party indemnity or (3) a qualifying pension scheme indemnity: secs 233–235 
of the CA 2006. A further exception is set out in sec 232(4), which is particu-
larly important in the context of a purported breach of sec 175 of the CA 
2006, ie the director’s duty to avoid a conflict of interest and duty. Sec-
tion 232(4) directs that a company is not prevented from ‘making such provi-
sion as has previously been lawful for dealing with conflicts of interest’ in its 
articles. Although the breadth of this provision is unclear, it does suggest that 
the company could enter into a contract, or insert provisions in its articles of 
association, duly carving or limiting the content of the statutory duty to avoid 
a conflict of interest and duty laid down in sec 175 of the CA 2006. In fact, 
such a technique is not uncommon in practice. 
78 However, it should be stressed that where a director commits a breach of one 
of the statutory duties, this does not prevent the company via a simple majori-
ty of its shareholders from passing an ordinary resolution under sec 239 of the 
CA 2006 in order to ratify the director’s breach, and as such, relieving that di-
rector of any liability for the breach of duty. In such a case, the company will 
no longer be entitled to take legal proceedings against that director.  
16.2. CASE STUDY (distribution of competences) 
79 No, unless D1 is somehow liable for a breach of his sec 174 duty of care, skill 
and diligence in failing to supervise or monitor the conduct, decisions or ac-
tivities of D2. However, since D1 is not a non-executive director, it is unlikely 
that he would be implicated for breach of such duty. As such, if anyone is 
likely to be held liable for breach of the sec 174 duty, then it is D2. 
16.3. CASE STUDY (authorisation of unlawful conduct) 
80 Although sec 39 of the CA 2006 provides that a company has unlimited ca-
pacity to contract, like all legal persons, it is subject to various controls on its 
capacity. For example, any provision in its articles of association which sets 
out unlawful objectives seeking to empower it or its directors to bribe offi-
cials, violate maximum working hours, or engaged in fraudulent activities 
would fall foul of the common law doctrine of illegality since it would in-
volve a breach of the criminal or employment law.127 Moreover, if a director 
failed to comply with such directions and his/her failure caused loss to C-
Corporation, it is unlikely that the director would be held by a court to be in 
 
127 See Bowman v Secular Society [1917] AC 406, 452 per Lord Sumner. 
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breach of duty despite the fact that he has failed to obey the constitution in 
non-conformance with sec 171(1)(a) of the CA 2006, or he/she has failed to 
comply with a shareholders’ resolution or the terms of his/her service agree-
ment. 
17. Adapting the standard of care expected of the board and its members 
81 No. See the answer to question 16 above, which explores the role of 
sec 232(1) of the CA 2006 in preventing the company from excluding a direc-
tor’s liability for negligence in the law of tort or breach of the statutory duty 
of care, skill and diligence set out in sec 174 of the CA 2006. Although there 
theoretically may be a distinction between (1) excluding liability for a breach 
of duty, and (2) modifying the content and scope of a duty, it is submitted that 
(2) is encompassed within the ambit of (1) in this context, ie in the context of 
the mischief of sec 232(1) of the CA 2006. As such, the absence of the words 
‘or limit’ after the word ‘exempt’ in line one of sec 232(1) of the CA 2006 
should not be taken as evidence of any intention on the part of the legislature 
to permit companies to validly limit a director’s liability for breach of the 
sec 174 duty. 
17.1. CASE STUDY (reduction of due diligence standard) 
82 No. See the answer to questions 16 & 17 above. 
18. Other limitations or exclusion of liability 
83 Yes, it is possible for the company to limit the liability of its directors, but not 
to completely exclude it. This is a reference to the three recognised exceptions 
set out above in the context of secs 233–235 of the CA 2006, ie where the di-
rector is provided with D&O insurance against liability for breach of duty, 
qualifying third party indemnity provisions or qualifying pension scheme in-
demnity provisions, by the company. The further exception, which enables the 
company to limit the director’s liability for a breach of the sec 175 duty to 
avoid a conflict of interest and duty is set out in sec 232(4). Section 232(4) di-
rects that a company is not prevented from ‘making such provision as has 
previously been lawful for dealing with conflicts of interest’ in its articles. 
Although the breadth of this provision is unclear, it does suggest that the 
company could enter into a contract, or insert provisions in its articles of asso-
ciation, duly carving or limiting the content of the statutory duty to avoid a 
conflict of interest and duty laid down in sec 175 of the CA 2006. In fact, in 
practice, it is quite common to find provisions of this kind in a company’s ar-
ticles of association. 
18.1. CASE STUDY (other limitation of liability) 
84 No, such agreements are prevented from attaining legal effect and validity by 
virtue of sec 232 of the CA 2006. If entered into, such contracts would be 
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void. The one exception is where any of these agreements at (a)-(h) relate to 
the director’s duty to avoid a conflict of interest and duty in terms of sec 175 
of the CA 2006. In such a context, agreements of the kind set out in (a), (b), 
(c), (e) and (f) above (but not (d), (g) and (h) – since they could operate to 
shape or limit the content of the sec 175 duty) may indeed be treated by a 
court as legally valid, although it should be stressed that the writers of this 
National report are not aware of any reported judicial decision to that effect. 
C. Authorisation and instructions by other organs of the company (in 
particular by the shareholders’ meeting) 
19. Powers and responsibilities in authorising and instructing the board 
85 Certain decisions cannot be taken by the board of directors without the prior 
approval or authorisation of the shareholders of the company: essentially, 
provisions of the CA 2006 which stipulate that the shareholders must pass an 
ordinary or special resolution before a particular decision can be taken by the 
company are the paradigm cases, eg an ordinary resolution is required to re-
move the auditors of the company,128 to remove a director129 or to approve a 
substantial property transaction entered into between the director and the 
company.130 Meanwhile, some of the decisions which the CA 2006 specifies 
must be passed by special resolution in order to be valid are as follows:  
1. the alteration of the articles of association of the company;131 
2. a change to the company’s name;132 and 
3. the disapplication of the statutory pre-emption rights on the al-
lotment of shares.133 
86 These statutory requirements for prior authorisation from the shareholders 
may be supplemented by the company providing in its articles of association 
for other circumstances where such an ordinary or special resolution must be 
passed in advance. Moreover, regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and 
Schedule 3, to the Model Articles direct that the shareholders of a plc by 
shares, private company limited by guarantee, or a private limited company 
by shares, have a reserve power to pass a special resolution instructing the di-
rectors to (i) take a specific course of action or decision, or (ii) refrain from 
taking a specified course of action or decision. 
 
128 CA 2006, sec 510(2)(a). 
129 CA 2006, sec 168(1). 
130 CA 2006, sec 190(1). 
131 CA 2006, sec 22(1). 
132 CA 2006, sec 77(2)(a). 
133 CA 2006, secs 570 and 571. 
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87 It is only the organ of the shareholders in general meeting, or by written reso-
lution procedure (in the case of a private limited company only) that enjoys 
these rights to influence corporate decision-making, which function as inher-
ent limitations on the power of the directors. No other organ or third party has 
this power. 
88 In exercising the right to vote on an ordinary resolution or special resolution, 
the shareholders are under no obligations of any kind, eg a duty of care. In-
stead, it is well-recognised by the law that the shareholders may prioritise 
their own personal interests at the expense of the company’s interests when 
they are deciding how to vote on a decision which requires an ordinary or 
special resolution to be passed: the shareholder’s share is treated as a property 
right.134 As such, they may freely vote their shares as they please.135 However, 
there is one important exception to the rule that members can exercise their 
vote in any way they think fit. This applies where the members of a company 
are required to pass a special resolution to alter the articles of association and 
the amendment introduced is likely to result in harm or loss to the company. 
In such circumstances, the law provides that the shareholder must exercise his 
vote in a way which is ‘bona fide’ for the benefit of the company as a 
whole.136 
19.1. CASE STUDY (authorisation of an apparently disadvantageous transac-
tion) 
89 If we begin with question 19.1, it is likely that the prior authorisation of the 
decision by the shareholders would remove any liability on the part of D for a 
breach of his statutory duty of care, skill and diligence set out in sec 174 of 
the CA 2006. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that prior authorisation 
functions in a similar way to ex post facto ratification of the director’s breach 
of duty by the passing of an ordinary resolution of the shareholders in terms of 
sec 239 of the CA 2006. In such a case, D would not be liable to C-
Corporation. Furthermore, the shareholders would not be held liable to C-
Corporation, since they are deemed to constitute the corporation. However, 
one point worth noting is that if C-Corporation subsequently entered into in-
solvent liquidation, it may be that post-liquidation, a liquidator appointed over 
the estate of C-Corporation would be able to recover some of C-Corporation’s 
losses in an action against the shareholders who voted in favour of this deci-
sion. This would be rooted in sec 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which ena-
bles a liquidator to take ‘wrongful trading’ proceedings against any director or 
shadow director of C-Corporation where some time before the commence-
 
134 CA 2006, sec 541. 
135 North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 Law Reports, Appeal Cases (LR 
App Cas) 589 (Privy Council) and Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple 
Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133. 
136 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch 656. 
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ment of the winding up of C-Corporation, those shareholders knew or ought 
to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that C-Corporation 
would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. It is possible that the sharehold-
ers of C-Corporation would be treated as a shadow director if they gave in-
structions to the board and the board was accustomed to act in accordance 
with those directions.137 Having said that, the potential for this post-
liquidation claim is admittedly slim, since each of the shareholders would 
have to be micro-managing the affairs of C-Corporation on a day-to-day basis, 
which is not necessarily apparent based on the facts of this scenario. 
90 Turning to the first alternative scenario, it is unlikely that the slight change in 
the circumstances would alter the answer to question 19.1 above, since the 
shareholders would be treated as having given prior authorisation of the deci-
sion. 
91 Again, the position would be the same in the case of the second alternative 
scenario. 
20. Instructions to the board or individual directors to implement certain 
management decisions 
92 Regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3, to the Model Arti-
cles direct that the shareholders of a plc by shares, private company limited by 
guarantee, or a private limited company by shares, have a reserve power to 
pass a special resolution instructing the directors to (i) take a specific course 
of action or decision, or (ii) refrain from taking a specified course of action or 
decision. This power of the shareholders to instruct is not subject to any con-
ditions. It ought to be said that it is only the shareholders in general meeting, 
or by written resolution procedure (in the case of a private limited company) 
who have this power to instruct the board of directors in this way. No other 
third party has this power. 
93 Turning to the consequences of such an instruction with respect to the liability 
of the board or director, it is likely that the prior instruction by the sharehold-
ers to the directors would remove any liability on the part of the directors for a 
breach of any of the statutory duties in terms of secs 171–178 of the CA 2006. 
The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the prior instruction of the share-
holders by special resolution functions in a similar way to ex post facto ratifi-
cation of the director’s breach of duty by the passing of an ordinary resolution 
of the shareholders in terms of sec 239 of the CA 2006. In such a case, the di-
rectors would not be held liable to the company for a breach of duty. Further-
more, the shareholders who made the instruction to the directors in terms of 
regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3, to the Model Arti-
cles, would not be held liable to the company, since they are deemed to con-
 
137 CA 2006, sec 251. 
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stitute the corporation. However, one point worth noting is that if the compa-
ny subsequently entered into insolvent liquidation, it may be that post-
liquidation, a liquidator appointed over the estate of the company would be 
able to recover some of the company’s losses in an action against the share-
holders who instructed the directors to take this management decision. 
20.1. CASE STUDY (instructions regarding illegal/disadvantageous man-
agement decisions) 
94 If the shareholders of C-Corporation gave advance authorisation to the cours-
es of action at (a)-(f) by ordinary or special resolution, then D will not be lia-
ble. See the response to question 20 above. 
20.2. . CASE STUDY ((instructions regarding distribution of profits) 
95 No, D would not be liable to the company or any of its shareholders and it is 
not possible to hold individual shareholders liable for corporate decision-
making. Finally, D would have no power or duty to prevent such a distribu-
tion, although if the company is on the brink of insolvency, then D ought to be 
mindful of his duty to the company to take into account the interests of the 
company’s creditors, and also to take care to engage in conduct which 
amounts to wrongful trading under sec 214 of the IA 1986. 
20.3. CASE STUDY (instructions regarding covert return of contributions) 
96 The answer is the same as that which applies for question 20.2 above, not-
withstanding that the transaction would likely constitute a breach of D’s duty 
of loyalty in terms of secs 171 and 172 of the CA 2006. The reason for this is 
that the transaction has been authorised by a majority of the shareholders of 
C-Corporation, i.e the equivalent of an ordinary resolution has been passed. 
However, it should be stressed that if C-Corporation subsequently entered into 
insolvent liquidation, it would be open to a liquidator to seek to rescind the 
contract concluded between C-Corporation and S1. Moreover, D ought to be 
mindful of his duty to the company to take into account the interests of the 
company’s creditors, and also to take care to engage in conduct which 
amounts to wrongful trading under sec 214 of the IA 1986. It is also possible 
that a liquidator could attack the transaction as a transaction concluded at an 
undervalue in violation of sec 238 of the IA 1986, on which, see the response 
to question 24.1 below. 
97 Turning to the alternative 1, D would be in breach of the duty of loyalty in 
terms of secs 171 and 172 of the CA 2006. Since a majority of the sharehold-
ers have not given advance authorisation to the transaction, D would be liable 
to C-Corporation. As such, S2 and S3 could attempt to instruct the board of C-
Corporation to commence litigation against D by passing a shareholder reso-
lution. However, the problem here for S2 and S3 is that a special resolution, ie 
75% would be required in terms of regulations 4 of Schedule 1, Schedule 2, 
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and Schedule 3, to the Model Articles. As such, S2 and S3 would not succeed 
in compelling C-Corporation to raise legal proceedings against D to have C-
Corporation annul the contract by rescission. Once again, it is worth noting 
that it is not possible to hold individual shareholders liable. 
98 Finally, with regard to alternative 2, the facts narrated may mean that D had 
breached sec 177 of the CA 2006. It is worth noting that D would have com-
plied with the statutory duty imposed by sec 190 of the CA 2006, since D 
passed a shareholder resolution commanding more than a simple majority of 
the votes, ie in excess of what is required for an ordinary resolution. As for 
the status of sec 177, the question is whether the shareholder resolution cures 
the breach of that provision. Arguably, it ought to relieve D from liability by 
analogy with sec 239 which requires an ordinary resolution to be passed to 
ratify a breach of the general duties in secs 171–177 on an ex post facto basis. 
However, there is a line of authority that certain breaches of director’s duties 
are so egregious that they cannot be authorised by a majority of the share-
holders in advance, or ratified by a majority of the shareholders ex post fac-
to.138 It is opined that this particular form of conduct on the part of D may fall 
into such a class of unauthorisable and unratifiable breach. 
20.4. CASE STUDY (instructions regarding covert return of contributions 
within a group of companies) 
99 In the above scenario, on the face of matters, D would be exposed to liability 
to C-Corporation or M-Corporation (as sole shareholder) for a breach of the 
general statutory duty in sec 172 of the CA 2006 to promote the success of C-
Corporation. D knows that the loan transaction between C-Corporation and A-
Corporation is disadvantageous to C-Corporation. As such, D is clearly aware 
that the loan is not for the benefit of C-Corporation. The effect of sec 178 of 
the CA 2006 is that C-Corporation would be entitled to rescind the loan trans-
action, eg by annulling the transaction. However, the fact that M-Corporation 
passed a shareholder resolution sanctioning the conclusion of the loan transac-
tion completely transforms the legal position. The effect of that shareholder 
resolution is to provide D with advance authorisation to commit C-
Corporation to the loan, which essentially exonerates D from liability. In other 
words, the ex ante shareholder resolution functions in the same way as an ex 
post facto shareholder resolution under sec 239 of the CA 2006 which pro-
vides ratification of D’s conduct, thus relieving D from any potential liability 
in respect of a breach of sec 172 of the CA 2006. 
100 It is very unlikely that M-Corporation would be exposed to liability to C-
Corporation as its sole shareholder. In company law, shareholders do not owe 
 
138 See KW Wedderburn, Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle [1957] 15 
Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 194; L Sealy, The Director as Trustee [1967] 25 CLJ 83, 
CA 2006, sec 239(7) and Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] BCC 885. 
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legal duties to their companies, unless it is possible to classify them as ‘shad-
ow directors’ in terms of sec 251 of the CA 2006, which is a rare occurrence 
in practice. In order to recover from M-Corporation, C-Corporation would 
have to establish each of the criteria for the establishment of the torts of negli-
gence or deceit, on which, see the responses to questions 23.1 and 23.2 below 
for more detail. 
101 Turning to the first and second alternative scenarios, the change of facts 
would not alter the assessment above. 
D.  Waiver of and agreement regarding indemnity 
21. Right and scope of waiver against board and its members 
102 Owing to the broad and comprehensive effect of sec 232 of the CA 2006 – 
which treats provisions in a contract or the company’s articles of association 
which exempt a director from liability for breach of duty as void (subject to 
certain limited exceptions) – the mechanism prescribed in sec 239 of the CA 
2006 is the only means available for a company to effectively waive its right 
to claim against a director for damages in tort or in respect of a breach of the 
director’s statutory duty in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006. Although the terms 
of sec 239 of the CA 2006 strictly do not provide for an agreement waiving 
the company’s right to damages for breach of the director’s duties, it does op-
erate as a functional equivalent to such a waiver agreement. It is provided that 
the shareholders of the company in general meeting may pass an ordinary res-
olution duly ratifying the director’s breach of duty, in which case, the direc-
tors are effectively relieved from liability. Section 239 provides that only the 
shareholders of the company have the right to represent the company in con-
nection with such a decision to release the directors from liability.  
21.1. CASE STUDY (waiver of right to pursue already incurred claims) 
103 As explained in the answer to question 21, any such waiver would be void as 
a result of the terms of sec 232 of the CA 2006. Moreover, it would only be 
possible for the shareholders of C-Corporation to pass an ordinary resolution 
under sec 239 duly releasing D from liability for breach of duty on an ex post 
facto basis, ie after the liability of the directors to C-Corporation had been in-
curred. This is the impact of the word ‘ratification’ in sec 239 of the CA 2006. 
As such, any ordinary resolution passed by the shareholders under sec 239 of 
the CA 2006 prior to the attachment or crystallisation of any liability on the 
part of D for breach of a statutory duty in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 would 
be ineffective. The one exception – in which case, the ex ante release of D 
may be legally effective – would be where the relevant decisions in respect of 
which D is seeking relief from liability, were taken as a result of the passing 
of an ordinary or special resolution of the shareholders in advance of the deci-
sion: see the responses to questions 19 and 19.1 above. 
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22. Indemnifying the board and its members from liability vis-a-vis third par-
ties in the event of prosecution 
104 Yes, indemnification by the company to the directors in terms of an indemnity 
agreement in respect of liabilities to third parties (not the company or one of 
its associated companies) is expressly permitted under sec 234 of the CA 
2006, which directors that: ‘provision for indemnity against liability incurred 
by the director to a person other than the company or an associated company 
[is permitted in law].’ 
105 Certain conditions are attached for the indemnity agreement to be valid. First, 
the indemnity agreement will be void under sec 232 of the CA 2006 if it sup-
plies an indemnity to the director in respect of any liability on his part to pay 
(i) a fine imposed in criminal proceedings, or (ii) a sum payable to a regulato-
ry authority by way of penalty in respect of non-compliance with any re-
quirement of a regulatory nature. Secondly, the indemnity agreement will also 
be ineffective if it protects the director from liability he has incurred in de-
fending criminal proceedings in which he has been convicted, or in defending 
civil proceedings brought by the company, or an associated company, in 
which judgment has been given against him. In light of these provisions in 
sec 234 of the CA 2006, an indemnity agreement purporting to indemnify a 
director from liability for breach of duty where the director is sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment would be void and invalid in law. The final question is 
whether the board of directors would have the right to represent the company 
in connection with such an indemnity agreement, to which the answer is yes, 
since the CA 2006 does not prescribe that the shareholders must give prior au-
thorisation to the decision of the company to enter into the indemnity agree-
ment, eg by passing an ordinary or special resolution. 
22.1. CASE STUDY (limits of indemnity provisions) 
106 No, in the case of (a), (b) and the second part of (d) (re the order for D to pay 
a fine), C-Corporation would not be liable to pay the legal costs, court fees, 
fines or compensation/damages for which D is liable. If an indemnity agree-
ment entered into by C-Corporation in favour of D provides that it will in-
demnify D in respect of liability to pay sums to third parties in the event that 
(i) he is convicted in criminal proceedings, or (ii) he is liable to pay a fine, 
then such an indemnity agreement does not meet the requirements of the ‘safe 
harbour’ provisions in sec 234 of the CA 2006. Instead, the circumstances will 
be subject to the general rule invalidating the agreement under sec 232 of the 
CA 2006. However, as regards (c) and the first part of (d) (re the award of 
compensation in favour of the co-worker), D would be covered by the third 
party indemnity agreement in terms of sec 234 of the CA 2006, and as such, D 
would be entitled to an indemnity from C-Corporation. 
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III. Liability for Damage to Third Parties 
23. Board's liability towards third parties 
107 Section 170(1) stipulates that the directors owe the statutory duties in 
secs 171–177 of the CA 2006 to the company, rather than to any individual 
shareholder or specific class or group of shareholders. The end result is that it 
is the company who can enforce a breach of such duties and the directors are 
not liable to the employees, suppliers, customers, etc. of the company. Alt-
hough it is possible for a director to owe such duties to specific shareholders, 
such liability arises through the law of agency on the basis that the director as-
sumes a fiduciary responsibility, rather than via company law.139 Moreover, 
so far as the liability of the directors to creditors goes, there is some authority 
to the effect that the directors owe the statutory duties in secs 171–177 of the 
CA 2006 to the creditors of the company when the company is nearing insol-
vency. However, the better view is that the said statutory duties are owed by 
directors to the company (and not to the creditors themselves) to have regard 
to the interests of the company’s creditors when the company is insolvent or 
borderline insolvent.140 The end result is that the creditors of the company 
have no standing to sue the directors when decisions are taken which preju-
dice their interests. Only a liquidator of the company could raise an action for 
breach of duty owed to the creditors. 
23.1. CASE STUDY (board’s instruction to inappropriate advice by sales rep-
resentatives) 
108 D will have no liability for breach of duty to P in company law, ie in respect 
of any breach of the statutory duties in secs 171–177 of the CA 2006. Of 
course, it is possible that D may be liable to compensate P for a breach of the 
duty of care owed by D to P in the law of negligence ie in the law of 
tort/delict. However, the imposition of such liability on D as a director in the 
law of tort is rare, since P would be required to establish that D had assumed 
personal responsibility to P and that P had reasonably relied upon the personal 
expertise of D, rather than C-Corporation.141 Since there is no suggestion that 
P and D have dealt with each other in a personal capacity, it is very unlikely 
that the requirements of the tort would be made out. Accordingly, D will not 
be liable to P. If the alternative is adopted and D directly engages with P in 
the sales, then this changes the complexion of matters slightly. However, P 
would still be required to satisfy a court that D had assumed a responsibility 
 
139 Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372. 
140 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 (CA); Kuwait Asia Bank EC v 
National Life Nominees Ltd. [1991] 1 AC 187, 217 (PC); Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg 
Investments Corporation (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 and Re HLC Environmental Projects 
Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch). See also A Keay, Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Inter-
ests (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review (LQR) 443. 
141 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830. 
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towards P and that P had relied on the expertise of D in a personal capacity 
when he acquired the product. Moreover, the court would adopt an objective 
evaluation as to whether it was reasonable for P to rely on D’s expertise in 
such a case. 
109 Personal liability may also arise under environmental law or product liability 
law. However, the potential for such personal liability under statute is not ad-
dressed in this report. 
23.2.  CASE STUDY (presenting false annual statements to third parties) 
110 In this case, there would appear to be evidence of P relying on the personal 
expertise of D in deciding to invest in C-Corporation. It is also likely that a 
court would apply an objective assessment of the facts to conclude that it was 
reasonable for P to rely on the advice, expertise and know-how of D in such a 
context. As such, there is a good chance that D would be personally liable to P 
for a breach of the duty of care in the law of tort as regards any negligent be-
haviour on D’s part. 
111 Where D’s actions are intentionally dishonest, then this is likely to constitute 
the tort of deceit.142 In such a case, there is no requirement for P to establish 
an assumption of responsibility on the part of D towards P. 
112 In the alternative scenario, yes, P may sue both D1 and D2. D1 and D2 will be 
acting in concert towards the commission of a tort. As such, D2 will be the 
primary tortfeasor and D1 the joint tortfeasor. It is sufficient that D1 and D2 
have come together to engage in activities which ultimately prove to be tor-
tious. It is possible for D1 to be liable as joint tortfeasor despite the fact that it 
was D2 who undertook the tortious act.143 
23.3. CASE STUDY (publishing an incorrect prospectus) 
113 In terms of sec 90 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, D will be 
under a general duty of disclosure and this duty will be breached where untrue 
or misleading information is included in the prospectus or relevant infor-
mation has been omitted from it. As such, D will be liable to pay compensa-
tion to P if P has suffered loss as a result of (i) any untrue or misleading 
statement in the prospectus, or (ii) the omission of any information required to 
be included in the prospectus. For such liability to be established, whether D 
intended to include untrue or misleading statements in the prospectus, or omit 
relevant information, is completely irrelevant. For other potential forms of 
 
142 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 1) [2003] 1 AC 959. 
143 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports (Lloyd‘s Rep) 19 at 42–
46, per Hobhouse LJ. 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in the United Kingdom 41 
civil liability which might arise in this case, see the response to question 23.2, 
ie liability in tort law, eg deceit, or the law of negligence. 
23.4. CASE STUDY (violation of cartel law) 
114 No, unless P is able to satisfy the requirements for the establishment of the 
torts of negligence or deceit – see answers to 23.2 above – there would be no 
civil liability on the part of D to P in competition law. UK competition law 
does not provide for the imposition of civil liability on directors to third par-
ties. 
23.5. CASE STUDY (infringement of competition law) 
115 No, unless P is able to satisfy the requirements for the establishment of the 
torts of negligence or deceit – see answers to question 23.2 above – there 
would be no civil liability on the part of D to P under the Consumer Protec-
tion from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008144 or the Business Protection from 
Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008.145 
24. Company insolvency: liability of the board and its members towards the 
company's creditors 
116 No, the creditors of the company would have no right to recover from the 
directors or the board on an individual or personal basis. Although the terms 
of sec 172(3) of the CA 2006 preserve the common law duty of the directors 
to have regard to the interests of the company’s creditors and there is some 
authority to the effect that the directors owe the statutory duties in secs 171–
177 of the CA 2006 to the creditors of the company when the company is 
nearing insolvency, the better view is that the said statutory duties are owed 
by directors to the company (and not to the creditors themselves) to have re-
gard to the interests of the company’s creditors when the company is insolvent 
or borderline insolvent.146 The end result is that the creditors of the company 
have no standing to sue the directors when decisions are taken which preju-
dice their interests. 
117 However, it should be stressed that a liquidator appointed over the estate of 
the company when the company enters into liquidation would have two op-
tions in relation to proceedings against a director. First, the liquidator could 
seek to enforce the duty owed to the company under sec 172(3). However, 
more likely is that the liquidator raises a claim against the director for ‘wrong-
 
144 SI 2008/1277. 
145 SI 2008/1276. 
146 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 (CA); Kuwait Asia Bank EC v 
National Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187, 217 (PC); Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg 
Investments Corporation (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 and Re HLC Environmental Projects 
Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch). 
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ful trading’ in terms of sec 214 of the IA 1986, ie that the director had contin-
ued to trade when he ‘knew or ought reasonably to have concluded that there 
was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insol-
vent liquidation.’147 For further details, see the response to question 12 above. 
24.1. CASE STUDY (delay in filing for insolvency) 
118 No, as noted in the response to question 24, although D will owe a com-
mon law duty to take into account the interests of C-Corporation’s creditors 
– such as P1, P2 and P3 – when C-Corporation is insolvent or borderline in-
solvent, this duty is owed to C-Corporation only. Accordingly, D owes no di-
rect duty to P1, P2 or P3 as the creditors of C-Corporation, who have no 
standing to sue the directors when decisions are taken which prejudice their 
interests. 
119 The only party who may take action would be the liquidator of C-Corporation 
on the basis that D engaged in wrongful trading in terms of sec 214 of the IA 
1986. Moreover, the liquidator may seek to annul the transactions between P1, 
P2 and P3 and C-Corporation on the basis that they amount to a ‘transaction 
at undervalue’ or a ‘fraudulent preference’. 148 A transaction at an under-
value is a transaction entered into between C-Corporation by way of gift 
to another, whereby that other party provides for C-Corporation to receive 
no consideration, or value of the consideration received is significantly 
less than the value of the consideration provided by C-Corporation. 
Meanwhile, a fraudulent preference is a transaction between C-
Corporation and a third party where the latter is one of C-Corporation’s 
creditors or a surety or guarantor for any of C-Corporation’s debts or lia-
bilities, and C-Corporation does anything which has the effect of putting 
that third party into a position which, in the event of C-Corporation going 
into insolvent liquidation, will be better than the position the third party 
would have been in if that thing had not been done. 
25. General duties owed by the board and its members towards creditors and 
liability for breach 
120 No, liability to creditors could only arise under the law of negligence in tort, 
on which, see the responses to questions 23 and 23.2 above. If a company en-
ters into insolvent liquidation or administration, a liquidator or administrator 
of the company may raise proceedings against a director under sec 214 of the 
IA 1986 on the basis of the ‘wrongful trading’ provisions in order to recover 
some of the losses of creditors. If a director is found to have traded wrongful-
ly in contravention of sec 214 of the IA 1986, the director will be personally 
 
147 IA 1986, sec 214(2)(b). 
148 IA 1986, secs 238 and 239. 
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liable in an amount to be specified by the court. For more comprehensive de-
tails about wrongful trading, see the response to question 12 above. 
25.1. CASE STUDY (personal liability for delay in filing financial statements)  
121 As explained above, P would not be entitled to sue D in company law for a 
breach of D’s statutory duties. However, D may be liable to P in the law of 
negligence in the law of tort, on which see the responses to questions 23 and 
23.2 above for the relevant criteria which must be satisfied for such a duty of 
care to arise. If there is no tortious liability, then P as a creditor will have no 
right to recover its losses directly from D. Only the liquidator of C-
Corporation would have the power to raise proceedings against D in the law 
of wrongful trading under sec 214 of the IA 1986, on which, see the responses 
to question 12 above. 
26. Direct liability of the board and its members towards creditors 
122 No. See the responses above. 
27. Limiting the liability of the board and its members towards third parties 
123 No, provision for limitation of liability in this way is not permitted under law 
and any contractual provision to that effect would be void under sec232 of the 
CA 2006. However, it would be valid for the company or a third party to grant 
a director an indemnity under any contract in respect of civil liability incurred 
by that director to any third party. This would cover any liability to a third 
party for breach of duty. Such an indemnity contract is expressly permitted 
under sec 234 of the CA 2006. For more detail, see the response to questions 
22 and 22.1 above. 
27.1. CASE STUDY (limitation of liability) 
124 No, provision for limitation of liability in this way is not permitted under 
company law and any contractual provision to that effect would be void under 
sec 232 of the CA 2006. Instead, the liability to the third parties would have to 
be limited via a third party indemnity contract in compliance with the criteria 
set out in sec 234 of the CA 2006: see the response to questions 22 and 22.1 
above for greater detail. 
IV. Procedural Law Aspects 
28. Persons and corporate organs can be parties to a suit for damages 
125 The following parties cannot be party to any legal proceedings in which legal 
action is taken against a director for negligence, default, breach of duty or 
breach of trust: (a) an individual director, (b) the whole board, (c) the individ-
ual members of any supervisory board, (d) the whole supervisory board, (e) 
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the shareholders’ meeting or (f) committees of all corporate organs. Only the 
company may sue a director for negligence, default, breach of duty, breach of 
trust.  
126 However, if the company decides not to raise legal proceedings against a 
director for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, then an in-
dividual shareholder, ie (e) above, will be entitled to raise a statutory deriva-
tive claim against the directors on one or more of these grounds under 
secs 260–269 of the CA 2006 if the criteria set out in secs 263 or 268 are sat-
isfied. If the shareholder is successful in his statutory derivative claim against 
the director for negligence, default, breach of duty, breach of trust, then any 
compensation or remedy will be for the benefit of the company, rather than 
the shareholder himself. 
29. Standing and requirements to sue for damages against the board 
127 It is the board of directors of the company that represents the company in a 
legal action for damages against the board. No special requirements are im-
posed for such a suit to proceed, although there would have to be a simple ma-
jority decision of the board in favour of raising such legal proceedings. If liti-
gation was initiated which was not backed up by a majority board resolution 
in favour of it, the litigation would not be prejudiced, since it is assumed that 
the directors have the authority to commit the company to litigation, save in 
exceptional circumstances.149 
30. Legal representatives and conflicts of interests 
128 If a lawyer who had represented a company or its board of directors was in-
structed by a third party to raise legal proceedings for damages against that 
board, this would give rise to a conflict of interest for that lawyer under both 
the common law and the professional rules of the Law Society and the Law 
Society of Scotland. As such, the lawyer would be prevented from acting for 
the party who instructed him/her to sue the board of directors in the absence 
of informed consent, ie full disclosure to the third party and the latter’s ex-
press consent to proceed with the litigation nonetheless. If such informed con-
sent were given by the third party, the lawyer would be entitled to sue the 
board, subject to the rules of his/her professional body 
31. Pursuing damages against the board and its members: procedural rules 
and competent court 
129 The civil courts have the competence to hear such claims. Some of the civil 
courts have special divisions that hear corporate law disputes, eg the Com-
mercial Court of the Outer House of the Court of Session. 
 
149 See CA 2006, sec 40 for director’s authority and third parties. 
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V. Insurance Law Aspects 
32. General statutory and non-statutory rules regulating D&O insurance 
130 D&O insurance has no specific legal regulation. Instead, the general law of 
insurance is deployed to regulate D&O insurance. D&O insurance is not regu-
lated by the UK Corporate Governance Code, which simply recognises at 
sec A.1.3 that ‘the company should arrange appropriate insurance cover in re-
spect of legal action against its directors’. Deductibles are common in D&O 
insurance policies governed by English law, but there is no legal requirement 
or regulation for, or of such deductibles. The author is unaware whether it is 
common market practice for deductibles to be covered by the insurance poli-
cy. 
33. D&O policies: parties, corporate representives and the treatment of pre-
miums 
131 The common arrangement is for the company to enter into a D&O insurance 
policy with an insurer whereby its directors are the insureds under the D&O 
insurance policy in respect of certain risks, although the definition of the in-
sureds is often extended to cover the company itself (i) where it indemnifies 
the directors, or (ii) where it is itself the subject of a claim. The company will 
pay the premiums, which obligation is usually set out and agreed in the ser-
vice contracts of the directors covered under the policy. It is not standard 
practice for the premiums paid by the company to be deducted from the re-
muneration of the directors covered under the insurance policy. It will be the 
directors of the company who have the authority and right to represent the 
company in concluding the insurance contract, eg by a simple majority deci-
sion of the board in favour of the conclusion of such a contract. 
34. Insured persons 
132 The insured persons are the directors, and sometimes also the company, as 
explained in the response to question 33 above. Yes, it is standard practice for 
a group of directors, officers, and sometimes employees, to be insured in one 
D&O insurance policy in respect of a defined risk or event. Yes, it is possible 
– and actually quite common – for a group of directors to be insured, as well a 
senior employees of a subsidiary or an affiliate company, eg under a Corpo-
rate Group D&O Insurance Policy. 
35. Standing to claim under a D&O policy 
133 Since the company will be a party to the D&O insurance policy, the company 
will be entitled to claim for performance where the contingency has occurred. 
Third parties can only assert direct claims against the insurer where the provi-
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sions of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 are satisfied, eg 
the director who is the insured becomes bankrupt, insolvent or dies.150 
35.1. CASE STUDY (claims for performance by the company) 
134 If C-Corporation is a party to the contract with I-Insurance – which would be 
a common way of arranging matters in the UK – then C-Corporation would 
indeed be entitled to asset the claim directly against I-Insurance. However, if 
C-Corporation is a third party, then it could only go directly against I-
Insurance if D had become insolvent, bankrupt or died, and a whole host of 
additional criteria under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 
have been satisfied. 
135 It does not matter whether D goes into hiding. As for the bankruptcy of D, 
then if C-Corporation was a third party, it would have the right to bring pro-
ceedings against I-Insurance to enforce its rights against I-Insurance and it 
would be entitled to a remedy under the D&O insurance policy once the court 
has made a declaration to the effect that D is liable to it, or a judgement or de-
cree is made to that effect, or an arbitral award in arbitral proceedings or by 
arbitration is made to that effect or an enforceable agreement with I-Insurance 
is reached to that effect. 
35.2. CASE STUDY (claims for performance by third parties) 
136 No, as a third party, P could only go directly against I-Insurance if D had 
become insolvent, bankrupt or died, and a whole host of additional criteria 
under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 have been satis-
fied. 
137 The fact that P has no direct contractual relationship with C-Corporation does 
not change the legal picture. 
138 If D becomes bankrupt, then P would have the right to bring proceedings 
against I-Insurance to enforce its rights against I-Insurance and it would be 
entitled to a remedy under the D&O insurance policy once the court has made 
a declaration to the effect that D is liable to P, or a judgement or decree is 
made to that effect, or an arbitral award in arbitral proceedings or by arbitra-
tion is made to that effect or an enforceable agreement with I-Insurance is 
reached to that effect. However, it should be stressed that it would be rare for 
D to be found liable to P based on a breach of D’s general statutory duties, a 
breach of a duty of care in tort or some other duty in tort, eg deceit. 
 
150 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010, secs 2–7. 
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36. Definition and occurrence of the insured event: D&O vs legal protection 
insurance 
139 The standard D&O Insurance Policy will tend to cover the following insured 
events, namely: any actual or alleged act, error or omission committed or at-
tempted by an insured person arising from the performance of the insured per-
son’s duties solely in their capacity as the company’s director, officer or em-
ployee including: 
1. breach of any duty, including fiduciary or statutory duty; 
2. breach of trust; 
3. negligence, negligent misstatement, misleading statement or neg-
ligent misrepresentation; 
4. defamation; 
5. wrongful trading under sec 214 of the IA 1986 (or equivalent leg-
islation); 
6. breach of warranty of authority; 
7. any other act, error or omission attempted or allegedly committed 
or attempted by an insured person solely because of their status 
as a director, officer or employee of the company. 
140 Standard D&O Insurance Policies will provide that the insured event is taken 
to have occurred when it actually occurs or is alleged to have occurred. The 
company then has a period of time from the occurrence of the insured event to 
notify the insurer, eg fourteen days from the insured’s first awareness of the 
occurrence of the insured event. If the company fails to notify the insurer 
within the prescribed time limits, then the company and the directors will not 
be covered by the policy protections. 
36.1. CASE STUDY (costs of defending a director against a claim by the 
company) 
141 Yes, it is standard practice for D&O Insurance policies to include cover in 
respect of defence costs and the costs of representation in respect of civil and 
criminal cases arising from an insured event, even where C-Corporation is the 
party who is claiming against the director concerned. 
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37. Scope of D&O coverage and the insurer's obligations D&O vs legal pro-
tection insurance 
142 Yes, it is standard for direct indemnification of the directors to extend to acts 
for which the corporate organisation is not legally required to indemnify the 
directors and officers, subject to standard exclusions for illegality, fraud, dis-
honesty, deliberate acts, fines, penalties, and punitive damages claims.  
143 Yes, standard D&O Insurance policies will cover the company’s losses which 
it is legally obliged or permitted to pay on behalf of a director arising from a 
claim against the director in respect of an insured event. 
144 No, claims relating to securities and share offerings are generally excluded by 
insurers. 
145 Yes, the terms of some D&O Insurance policies stipulate that the insurer will 
advance defence and legal representation costs to the company, but this is 
usually restricted to circumstances where the company is legally prohibited 
from granting an indemnity to the director or advancing such costs to the di-
rector itself. Advance payments may also be made to enable a director to de-
fend allegations of fraud or dishonesty, provided that the insurer will be enti-
tled to reclaim such advance costs where such allegations are proven in crimi-
nal or regulatory proceedings. 
146 It is common practice for the insurer to have the right, but not the obligation, 
to appoint legal counsel and take control of the defence of the claim. The right 
of the individual insured person to appoint legal representatives is commonly 
limited, so that such person will have no option but to rely on the insurer’s 
choice of legal counsel. 
37.1. CASE STUDY (advance payments for legal defence) 
147 No, if D engages in the lawsuit to defend himself, this will not constitute an 
insured event under a standard D&O Insurance Policy. Instead, it is the breach 
of duty itself that will constitute the insured event. Unless C-Corporation 
complies with the terms of the notification requirements set out in the D&O 
Insurance Policy, D will be off-cover. As such, he will have no right to be 
paid compensation for the costs of legal representation. Moreover, if C-
Corporation notifies out of time, the standard policy exclusion in a D&O In-
surance Policy will apply to classify D’s litigation as ‘prior litigation’, which 
will mean that D is off-cover for the full period before the lawsuit is finally 
terminated. 
37.2. CASE STUDY (fines and imprisonment) 
148 The D&O Insurance Policy will not respond in respect of any of these pay-
ments, since standard exclusions apply to fines and criminal convictions, re-
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gardless of whether they were negligently or intentionally committed by the 
director. 
37.3. CASE STUDY (pure economic loss/mass claims) 
149 D could only be held liable to the investors if the requirements for a duty of 
care in the law of tort were satisfied, on which, see the responses to questions 
22 and 23.2 above. If the duty of care in the law of negligence in tort is made 
out, the courts would apply an objective test in order to determine whether 
D’s opinion was ‘wrong’. The D&O Insurance Policy would likely respond, 
in which case, D would be entitled to defence costs, costs of legal representa-
tion and an indemnity if he is found civilly liable to the investors. However, it 
should be stressed that some insurers exclude liability to directors such as D 
where the company, eg C-Corporation, enters into insolvent liquidation. As 
such, much depends on the extent of the cover agreed upon in the D&O Insur-
ance Policy. 
38. Duties of D&O policy holders and insurers’ right to participate in the 
claims handling process 
150 See the responses above regarding the standard terms of D&O Insurance Poli-
cies concerning the duty to notify and the insurer’s right to step in and handle 
claims and conduct such claims, including the negotiation of any settlement. 
A consequence of breach of the notification obligation is that the parties are 
off-cover. 
39. Typical exclusions from coverage in D&O policies 
151 The following are typically excluded from cover in the standard D&O Insur-
ance Policy: 
1. Illegality, fraud or dishonesty on the part of the insured or the di-
rectors; 
2. Liabilities in respect of fines, penalties or punitive damages claims; 
3. Liabilities arising in respect of deliberate or conscious acts or 
omissions on the part of the director; 
4. Claims under prior and pending litigation or retrospective date ex-
clusions; 
5. Claims or circumstances notified under a previous insurance poli-
cy; 
6. Claims arising in the US which involve a claim by the company 
against the directors insured; 
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7. Liabilities relating to pollution or liabilities that are environmental 
in nature; 
8. Liabilities in respect of personal injury, manslaughter or property 
damage; 
9. Claims arising from public or private offerings of the company’s 
shares or securities. 
152 It ought to be highlighted that some of the above claims, liabilities and losses 
may be insured by an insurer as an extension to cover if a higher premium is 
paid by the company. 
153 If claims, liabilities or losses connected with deliberate or conscious acts or 
omissions, illegality, fraud or dishonesty, etc. were on-cover in the D&O In-
surance Policy, this would nonetheless be contrary to public policy. In such a 
case, the insurer would have the right to terminate the policy, since there is a 
rule of English and Scottish Insurance Law that the insured must not make a 
fraudulent claim, eg if the insured causes the event or risk insured. As such, 
the insurer would not be liable to pay out on any claim under the D&O Insur-
ance Policy and the director would find himself off-cover.151 
40. Claim for determining the insurance coverage 
154 It is standard practice for D&O Insurace Policies to provide that in the event 
of a dispute between the insurer, the company and/or any insured director 
over cover, proposed settlement or continuing the defence of a claim, the in-
surer or the company may request that a legal opinion be procured from a mu-
tually agreed Queens Counsel at the English, Scottish or Northern Irish bar, or 
equivalent in a different jurisdiction. Such opinion is treated as binding on the 
parties and will establish whether policy cover exists, and/or the defence of 
such a claim will continue or settlement will be agreed. It is common for the 
terms to stipulate that the costs of such an opinion will be met by the insurer. 
41. Differences between the legal position of the board or director 
41.1. CASE STUDY (comparison of D&O insurance v exclusion of liability) 
155 The D&O Insurance Policy described in (a) would be valid in terms of 
sec 233 of the CA 2006. However, the term of D’s contract of employment or 
conditions of appointment referred to at (b) would be void under sec 232 of 
the CA 2006. Therefore, D would not be entitled to rely on this exclusion of 
liability under his contract of employment or conditions of appointment. 
 
151 Insurance Act 2015, sec 12.  
